


JPRS-UMA-94-037
7 September 1994



**FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE**

JPRS Report

Central Eurasia

Military Affairs

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Central Eurasia

Military Affairs

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ARMED FORCES

Data on Men, Materiel Withdrawn From Abroad

MM3108131594 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
31 Aug 94 p 1

[Article by Viktor Litovkin: "How Many of Us Were There"]

[Text]

Country	Servicemen	Operational-tactical Missile Launchers	Tactical Missile Launchers	Tanks	Armored Fighting Vehicles	Artillery	Airplanes	Helicopters
Germany	351,274	62	90	7,900	7,537	4,414	940	785
Poland	44,088	12	8	685	963	449	300	134
Czechoslovakia	75,000	12	18	1,412	2,563	1,240	127	189
Hungary	60,500	12	24	1,292	1,679	798	270	160
Mongolia	75,500		22	1,816	2,531	1,416	192	123
Cuba	560							
Moldavia				54	26	8		
Lithuania	35,054]							
Latvia	50,357]—			682	2,504	1,265	588	141
Estonia	30,724]							
Transcaucasus	36,000			44	474	60	297	312
Total [figures as published]	759,057	98	162	13,214	18,305	9,668	2,722	1,844

The Russian Army has come back inside its borders. The figures which we publish attest to the tremendous military potential that the Soviet Union maintained outside its borders, as well as to the large-scale operation which the Russian Army mounted to withdraw these troops. Unfortunately, owing to the restrictions of the newspaper page, the statistical information cited by us is far from complete.

The figures which we cite make no mention of the 17 submarines and 227 ships and support vessels which the Baltic Fleet has withdrawn from Germany and Poland, nor do they include their crews, and yet there were approximately 3,000 seamen. Nor have we mentioned the 1.5 million tonnes of ammunition from the FRG, Mongolia, and Poland, which required 25,000 railcars to transport and which have now overflowed the old arsenals, which were already crammed full. Nor have we mentioned much besides.

Our table does not contain a word about members of officers' families or civilian employees of groups of forces abroad. There were almost half a million of them, along with servicemen—1.2 million. In no country have so many people moved to a new place of residence in the

space of two or three years. But even this includes far from all those who have moved and who are still to move, following the soldiers in returning from abroad to their historical motherland. From the far and the near abroad.

Their problems, like those of the officers withdrawn from abroad, are particularly acute today. In parallel with the eastward movement of trains the state has pledged to construct for its Army 126,700 apartments, 500 social, cultural, and domestic projects, approximately 460 barracks, and 2,300 storage facilities for combat hardware and weapons. It has promised to allocate 427.8 billion rubles [R] for this at 1992 prices.

Never mind about the iron. But so far only 30,000 apartments, 10 hostels with 1,000 places, 19 barracks for 4,500 soldiers, and 14 social, cultural, and domestic projects have been constructed for the Army which has returned. As for money, just R217 billion has been allocated, and at present prices.

The Army has fulfilled its hard masculine work, but now, amid the thunderous sound of farewell marches, the state should not forget its debts to its own defenders.

Last of 144th Withdrawn From Estonia

94UM0585B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 30 Aug 94 p 1

[Article by Sergey Knyazkov: "Withdrawal of Russian Forces From Estonia To Be Completed on 30 August"]

[Text] The last train of the 144th Guards Motorized Rifle Division of the Russian forces left the capital of the Estonian Republic for the Moscow Military District.

It was reported to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA from the division headquarters in Tallinn that a motor vehicle column carrying the formation's last military servicemen will leave for Russia on 30 August. This will bring an end to the withdrawal of Russian forces from Estonia.

Potential for Military Threat to State, Individuals

944F1405A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 24 Aug 94 pp 1-2

[Article by Col. in the Reserves Yuriy Deryugin, candidate of philosophical sciences (Association of Military Sociologists), under "Expert's Opinion" rubric: "Alarming Tendencies in the Russian Army: the Armed Forces May Change From a Means of Security Into a Threat to the the Individual and the State"]

[Text]

Below the Poverty Line

As early as 1992 there arose a progressive tendency toward the slide of most families of servicemen below the poverty line. The military turned out to be the social group least suited to the market economy. The only source of revenue for the family budget is the pay of the officer or warrant officer. According to the Center for Sociological, Psychological, and Legal Research of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 42 percent of the officers' wives do not work and only 13.5 percent receive help from their parents. The insurance fund in the form of monetary savings is extremely limited—it is practically nonexistent in 75 percent of the families. The material state of military personnel is quite comparable to the situation of some categories of the scientific intelligentsia and employees. The pay of officers in the Far East and Transbaykal military districts is 25-30 percent of the cost of living in these regions.

In addition to the extremely unstable material position of cadre military personnel, there is the problem of the lack of essential housing. It may be expected that the slow resolution of the housing question will ultimately

result in a surge of discontent among officers as soon as the forces from the Baltic region and from Germany return to Russian soil.

An Army of Contradictions

But as complex as the problem of the support of the Army may be, the main danger that it faces is not here. The threat to the army organism emanates above all from the social stratification of the military. Today's army is an army of polarities charged with the latent energy of internal conflict.

The separation of military formations into elite and nonelite units actually gives rise to first and second-class service personnel. The potential for conflict here is based not only on the fact that the former, pampered by the authorities, have some material advantages, whereas the latter do not. The matter is much more complex than that. One should not forget that the traditional sense of social justice inherent in military personnel (which cannot be eroded away in two or three years) brings about a quite justified protest against the illegal and artificial status of the new army elite. If one thereby considers that the so-called elite units are maintained for the performance of military-police functions and that some of them have already fired on their own people (which is already perceived negatively in the forces), then it becomes clear the kind of potential danger that such a division involves.

Nor does the internal differentiation in the officer corps promote stability in the Army. Here one can distinguish several social groups. The first is from the lieutenant to the captain. These are pragmatics. They mostly try to avoid being transferred to some "hot spot." Another objective is to assemble some capital, get their lives together, and leave the Army. Today a young lieutenant is not interested in a career.

The second group is from the major to the front-line major general. The latter is not a functionary but a working man. They are called "servicemen." They are supporters of regulations, tradition, and order. These people have nowhere to go. It is too late for them to do their own thing in civilian life. They want to establish themselves in the Army. Here is some information about their attitudes: about 50 percent of them do not support privatization, 60 percent are against the liberalization of prices, and about 40 percent are adherents of the radical patriotic idea.

The third group is that of the so-called "crafty ones." They are functionaries serving in "Arbat military district," that is, in the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff. They are "sitting" nicely and their way of survival is to watch the indicator of the social and political scales and to act accordingly.

The Military-Commercial Clan

There is also a social division in the Army with respect to the nearness of officers and generals to the property of the Army and Navy. This was seen especially graphically in the Western Group of Forces. Here a criminal-mafia clan arose through:

- the establishment of joint-stock companies that have become the channel for the sale of "surplus" Army property;
- the sale through private channels of goods supplied to the Army and free from customs duties and taxation;
- cooperation with German firms that are also outside the tax legislation of Germany. EC subsidies and even humanitarian aid here frequently went through mafia-criminal channels, by-passing legal consumers.

Through the named economic mechanisms in the Western Group of Forces, a new social formation began to arise in the Army—the military-commercial clan. Today one can speak of the spread of the military-commercial clan throughout the entire Army (to different degrees). There are at least two processes behind this: the commercialization of the consciousness of the officer corps and the possibility of the merger of the military-commercial clan with the higher military elite. But it should not be forgotten that whereas at one pole there is the rich man with shoulder boards (as a rule, with a gold zigzag field), at the other pole is the front-line officer with a worn army overcoat, whose wife has to count the pennies left from his pay. A conflict between these two figures is almost inevitable.

Contract Personnel and Draftees

The social stratification has also affected the lower levels of the Army. With the coming of so-called contract personnel to the military society, a new community of service personnel formed. It is the bearer of many negative traditions (most of the soldiers being recruited to the Army under contract have already served in the Armed Forces and went through the school of hazing at precisely the time when it existed in its severest form). Most of the contract personnel came to the Army to sit through the "years of hardship" and to have an income and a roof over their heads. Meanwhile, this category of personnel has a clearly expressed attitude toward their barracks "comfort" at the expense of conscripted personnel. Clearly we should expect the beginning of the process of the transformation of hazing into some new phenomenon having to do with a further dramatic worsening of internal relations in the forces.

At the other pole are soldiers coming to the Army under conscription. Most of them are physically weak and completely unprepared young people with an extremely eroded and clearly negative attitude toward military service. According to survey results, 72 percent of officers assess the quality of the replacements coming to the Army as unsatisfactory. More than 50 percent of the

conscripts express their objections against serving and an equal number are extremely passive about the problems of the army collective; 64 percent are either indifferent or approve of those who desert the Army. At the same time, it can hardly be supposed that this social category of service personnel is fully prepared for unconditional and degrading subordination to contract personnel. A fight between these two poles is unavoidable and will most likely take place in violent forms.

Dissatisfaction of Officers

The growing social tension in the Army is being manifested in the dissatisfaction of the officers, their apathy and indifference, and a dramatic lessening of their dedication to the service. Sociologists from the Center for Military-Sociological, Psychological, and Legal Research on the Russian Army state that 42 percent of officers see no prospects in the service, just as many declare a willingness to leave the Army if the situation does not improve, and 32 percent of the officers and 50 percent of officer candidates in military schools have no confidence about tomorrow.

An Explosion From Within

Thus, the worsening of the material situation of the officer corps, the lack of prospects for the resolution of this problem in the near future, and the absence of a system for the social protection of service personnel, all of which are developing with the background of the dramatic social polarization, are fraught with a further increase in tension in the military environment and, in the final analysis, with the danger of an internal social explosion in the Army. This is one of the real threats to the security of the Russian society today.

Lack of Professionalism

Only very late did the military leadership of Russia come to understand the necessity of increasing the professionalism of army labor. But the realization of this process under the conditions of the general economic crisis, the crisis in the military-industrial complex, and the reduction of the defense budget are leading not only to a dramatic weakening of the material-technical base for the training of military personnel but also to its curtailment. The technical factor is most noticeable among the elements curbing the professionalization of the Russian Army. It is being manifested in an acceleration of the obsolescence and deterioration of equipment and weapons.

According to the Glavkomat [expansion not given] of the Ground Troops, the named process will affect 70-80 percent of armored equipment in the next few years. This is also affirmed by most experts (55 percent), whereas 13 percent of the respondents point to major problems existing in the troops with respect to the servicing of combat equipment and weapons and to the conflict that has arisen between the demands on the level of technical combat readiness of the troops and its actual

state. Everywhere is felt a serious lack of fuel and lubricants for the execution of planned exercises using combat equipment. In this connection, the number of flights and land and sea operations is declining dramatically. Such a situation undermines the interest of military personnel, especially of officers, in the assimilation of up-to-date means of armed combat, this being one of the main motives for service activity.

Threat of a Military-Technical Disaster

In speaking of this, one must pay attention to the process of increasing adaptation of officers, soldiers, and sergeants in compulsory service to nuclear missiles. Today they no longer appear in the role of some kind of mysterious monster, as they were several decades ago. But where is the guarantee that such an attitude, especially under the conditions of a catastrophic decline in the level of discipline and organization, will not result in a disaster caused by a mistake through incompetent or careless work or the negligent storage or transport of weapons of mass destruction?

The huge explosions heard at military depots in Vladivostok (the latest, according to exports, was equal in power to the detonation of a small nuclear bomb) are another reminder to the society that a threat has arisen of a disaster of a military-technical nature coming from the Army in peacetime.

Crime in the Army

It can hardly be considered an exaggeration to compare the atmosphere prevailing in the army barracks with the microclimate in institutions of corrective labor. One of the arguments is the state of crime in the Army and navy. In 1993, soldiers in the internal forces committed more than 2,000 crimes (already 600 in the first four months of 1994). At the same time, last year they localized or prevented 300 crimes. One asks why Russia needs such "unprofitable" military units, if we can put it this way?

The situation is no better in the Russian Army. In the first 9 months of 1993 alone, military courts examined 10,000 criminal cases. At the same time, we have seen a tendency (it is being confirmed this year as well) toward an increase in the number of group crimes and deliberate murders. The number of crimes for personal gain increased by a factor of 2.5.

The Army is turning into a means for the criminalization of the consciousness of young people. And in this sense, it involves a potential threat to the security of the Russian society. Moreover, under conditions in which

organized crime is increasing in the country, one cannot ignore the possibility of an increase in its ties with army criminal elements.

Loss of Service Personnel

On the other hand, an increase in internal tension in the Army and its criminalization may lead if not to a social explosion in the society than to mass demonstrations by certain strata of the population, especially parents of draftees.

This potential for discontent builds up every day and is linked, in turn, with the loss of personnel. Every year about 1,500 men perish in the Russian Army (this figure was 5,000 in the Armed Forces of the USSR).

The continuing increase in suicidal incidents, the barbarous cases, and the violence against soldiers (which was especially terrible on Russkiy Island) is all evidence that for objective and subjective reasons the ruling military elite is not able to bring about a radical improvement in the situation in the Army.

Three Conclusions

Thus, the sociological analysis of the processes taking place in the Army allows one to draw the following conclusions.

In the first place, under the great influence of the national crisis affecting all areas of life in the society, the Russian Armed Forces are in a state close to internal social degradation and, to a certain extent, are changing from a means to guarantee security to an integrated threat to individuals, the state, and the society.

Secondly, the most dangerous among these threats are:

- the threat of an internal social explosion within the Army itself;
- the threat to the society as a result of the increased possibility of a disaster of a military-technical nature;
- the threat of social conflicts between the Army and the society as a result of loss of personnel and a situation of the individual in the Army similar to that of a prisoner in an institution for corrective labor;
- the threat of the transformation of the Army into a means for the criminalization of the consciousness of the young generation and the merging of army criminal elements with mafia and corruptive structures.

Thirdly, the long time without resolving problems in the military environment helps to convert the Army into a "third power," in which to save the Armed Forces against final disintegration the generals and officers will resort to decisive actions to transfer the power to the most capable political forces.

Morale, Motivation of Incoming Junior Officers

94UM0573B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 20 Aug 94 p 3

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Yuriy Rubtsov: "Today Battalion Commanders but Tomorrow... Who Are These Officers Who Are Currently in School"]

[Text] It is difficult to enroll in the Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze [VAF]. It is difficult to study. Nevertheless, those who wish to enter are not decreasing. Only a person who is totally indifferent to the history of our Army does not feel his heart pound and a sudden chill along his spine from the sudden agitation at the sight of the enormous marble plates with the deep letters of the names of VAF alumni. Marshals Georgiy Zhukov and Rodion Malinovskiy, Leonid Govorov and Matvey Zakharov, Generals Nikolay Vatutin and Mikhail Kirponos, Lev Dovator and Ivan Panfilov, Dmitriy Ledyushenko and Pavel Batov...

Today, figuratively speaking, the military leaders of the 21st Century are being seated in school. What kind of person is he, the Russian officer who desires to become a high class professional precisely when the prestige of officer service has noticeably diminished in public opinion and thousands of the comrades of the future "academicians" in the army's ranks are hurrying to leave those ranks, preferring commerce? You will agree: it is both curious and instructive to find the answer.

To begin, I will introduce several of my interlocutors.

Lieutenant Colonel Igor Ozhuzhenko—is the commander of a tank battalion of the 201st Motorized Rifle Division. Upon graduation from military school, he received a diploma with honors. He has been in the division since 1985. He was accepted into the Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze without taking the competitive examinations in accordance with a Russian Federation Minister of Defense order.

Lieutenant Colonel Aleksandr Terekhin—is the commander of a motorized rifle battalion in Urals Military District. He graduated from military school with a gold medal. He has 16 years of service. He has been in his current position for four years.

Major Oleg Yefremov—is the battalion chief of staff of a Northern Fleet coastal defense division. His duty location is Arkhangelsk Oblast. Having completed Ordzhonikidze VOKU [Higher Combined-Arms Command School] with a diploma with honors, he has served all of the time in the "godforsaken" locations of the North.

Captain Sergey Titarenko—ended up in a Black Sea Fleet coastal defense division after service in the Far East. He is a division headquarters assistant department chief.

Major Aleksandr Trusov—is a border guard. He has served all nine years in the Caucasus after graduation from military school. He commanded a border outpost

and right now he is a senior staff officer of a border detachment that is located in Armenia.

I am not being sly: they did not specially select the people for a journalist. An ordinary study group—and, in my view, it provided a quite definite impression about the current officer corps. On the geography of service, on the political background in which this service is occurring, on successes and failures, hopes and despairs. And it is gratifying that my interlocutors are not simply slaving away but are honing their service skills with merit, seeing the prospects both for themselves and for the army as a whole.

The officers' healthy ambition attracts attention to itself. Oleg Yefremov frankly stated: "I am not hiding the fact that I want to become a general". He was not the only one who talked with me about higher military education as a condition for promotion in the service. And actually what is shameful in that? The officers plan to blaze a trail upward through intense labor, by combining study with the accomplishment of their official duties, and not at the expense of others, without clicking their heels before the leadership, and without intrigues. And in the process they are not counting on indulgences. Others, like Major Sergey Bejyaev, are not turning away from the desire to become VAF students even if they have failed to be accepted in the past.

One more thing is important: their native collectives have supported the officers' strivings for new ranks. "The Military Academy imeni Frunze is highly coveted among the border guards," noted Major Trusov. "There have not been any 'academicians' in our regiment for several years. Therefore, when I came here, everyone—from the battalion commander to the platoon commander—wished me success," said Lieutenant Colonel Terekhin. And I saw Captain Titarenko immediately after a telephone conversation with his fellow servicemen. He was very happy: "It's as if my matriculation is just about the main news of the day at my unit."

Having selected their profession—to defend the Fatherland, many servicemen, through their positive influence, have predetermined the same choice by their close relatives. Khabarovsk Border Troops Institute Cadet Division Commander Lieutenant Colonel Aleksandr Tsukanov has three brothers. "Two are already in uniform," smiles the officer, "and the third is preparing to do the same." You know, there may be a military dynasty of Tsukanovs...

I will note: contemporary officers have become more sensitive to these issues in recent years when we have begun, more broadly than before, to talk about the Army's roots that go back into the ancient past and about the Russian army's traditions. And here my new comrades—during our contacts we became good friends—did not become an exception. A year ago, when the Ukrainian military attempted to once again violate the agreement on the Black Sea Fleet, the Officers' Assembly decided to raise the Andreyevskiy Flag at the Russian

coastal defense division that is deployed in Simferopol. "If you could have seen the solemnity with which this ritual was carried out," Titarenko told me. "Prior to that, many servicemen had only seen the Andreyevskiy Flag in a museum but they stood under it like they had been standing under it for 100 years. For us, it is still the embodiment of a unified Black Sea Fleet..."

The threat of reductions has hung over the division where Major Yefremov serves. "My fellow servicemen have decided," said Oleg, "that they are destroying their history with their own hands. The celebrated Battalion of Glory and the Company of Heroes are in the division. Our regiment is the holder of an order and is named. And everything is 'under the knife'? History will remain in the archives but it must stand with us in ranks. What will we teach our boys?"

No matter what kind of problems we have touched upon, it is this view that was characteristic for my interlocutors—through the prism of the interests of the army and the state. People didn't slip into any complaints whatsoever about their own fates but saw our common problems: low wages, the lack of housing—junior officers are leaving the army; the rash reduction of the strength of the army—the military ranks are losing highly qualified specialists; traditions are suddenly being stopped—what do we use to train the future defenders of the Homeland?

We would least of all like for the junior officers about whom we are speaking to constitute some sort of knights without fear or doubt. No, they have normal "involvement". But do not take that away: that trait of the Russian officer, the essence of which has been laconically expressed by the previously mentioned Lieutenant Colonel Aleksandr Tsukanov, is clearly visible in them: "We are 'state' people and under all conditions must first and foremost exert efforts to our duty—service to the Homeland."

**Commentary of Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze
Deputy Chief Lieutenant-General Yevgeniy
Meshcheryakov:**

In my view, the selection of this year's students demonstrates a consistent tradition: despite the complex sociopolitical situation in the country and the contradictory processes associated with reform of our Armed Forces, the officer corps' interest in higher military education has not diminished. People are striving to become genuine professionals of their profession—and that is the main thing.

Nearly one third of the candidates for admission view acquiring knowledge as the primary motive for studies at VAF. Another more than 20% admit that without an academy education they will not be able to carry out, in a qualitative manner, the duties of positions that are higher than the ones they hold today. And only 7.5% see the sense of studies only in promotion in the service. Although even here we will not go to extremes: not only an undisguised bureaucrat can impact those views but

also a man with healthy ambition. A little over one percent of those polled cannot see another way to leave a "hot spot" or a duty location that they are tired of.

In my view, these numbers are also curious. Two-thirds of the candidates for admission enter from command positions, eight percent hold staff positions and two percent hold teaching positions. Over 82% of the officers are of the most optimal age—29-35—to continue service at the regimental-division echelon.

Moreover, it would be incorrect to not note those negative factors that affect our officer corps. The majority with whom I had the opportunity to chat note: the crisis in society, the absence of proper attention to the RF Armed Forces on the prestige of officer service is somehow or other having an impact. Indeed, to varying degrees. More than a fourth of those polled think: it is unambiguously negative. It's interesting that at this time 17.5% of those polled do not see the impact of these factors on—pay attention—professionals and 10% even expressed the opinion that the crisis in society and the desire of an officer-patriot to become a true professional are directly dependent on each other.

For myself I have once again arrived at the conclusion: rumors about the rapid "death" of our officer corps, its erosion, the elimination of skilled cadres, and the loss of vital orientation points that have been disseminated by other mass media are, putting it mildly, highly exaggerated. At the same time, I don't think that special proof is needed that society must nevertheless pay attention to its armed defenders.

Burlakov Interviewed on GSFG Veterans' Union

94UM0585A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
27 Aug 94 p 1

[Interview with Col-Gen Matvey Prokopyevich Burlakov, commander-in-chief of the Western Troop Grouping, by Sergey Pashayev; place and date of interview not given: "Veterans' Union Will Accept Baton From WGF"]

[Text] As was already reported by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, on 16 March the RF Ministry of Justice officially registered the "ZGV (GSFG) Veterans' Union." The advent of the new public organization did not go unnoticed, and the editor's office is receiving letters from those who served, worked and studied in Germany. Our correspondent met with the President of the union—Colonel-General Matvey Burlakov, the commander-in-chief of the Western Group of Forces (yesterday he was appointed Deputy RF Minister of Defense), and asked him to answer questions from the newspaper's readers.

[Pashayev] Matvey Prokopyevich, the years of perestroika and post-perestroika gave birth to numerous public organizations. Often they disappear as quickly as they are born. How does the activity of the union you

head differ from that of others, and do you have the confidence that it will live a long life, and be beneficial?

[Burlakov] I'm certain of this. For many reasons. First, history has never before seen a foreign force grouping that is so unique in composition, purpose and professionalism. It has a good half-century history. Moreover the GSFG-WGF was not only a field academy for the forces, after all, and not only a proving ground for new models of equipment and armament, but also a home for people for many years. Second, together we have accumulated extremely rich experience in cooperation, and we do not have the right to throw it away. It does not belong to individuals—it is a legacy of history. Finally, recall the graves of our compatriots on foreign soil—they must be cared for. All of this and many other things served as motivations for our union's creation.

Nor should it be forgotten that the people are not growing any younger with the years. They will doubtlessly need the shoulders of their friends, comrades and fellow servicemen. Finally, there is the memory. It unites us, and it will continue to unite us for many long years. The cooperative spirit, the spirit of comradeship and mutual assistance is a natural feeling in people who served in the army. All the more so in this unique group of forces.

[Pashayev] I'm ready to agree with you, but the pessimism of the people was not born in a vacuum. Many are promising many things today. In what practical ways can the union help the common people—former servicemen of the GSFG-ZGV?

[Burlakov] First of all it will help them to feel that they are not alone. For elderly people, particularly for front-line veterans, this alone is very important, I believe. Sometimes elementary assistance and a sign of attention are the best medicine against spiritual and physical ailments. In general, the union must preserve the traditions of our group of forces—it has extended a helping hand to many people in their misfortune. Thousands of disabled veterans of Afghanistan and Chernobyl are directly aware of this. It would of course be naive to think that the union will enjoy an enormous amount of income and that it will carry out benevolent acts on a large scale. Our membership dues are low, and they are one-time dues at that.

[Pashayev] Nonetheless you can't make it without funds, without help from people. This is a question that appears in every letter.

[Burlakov] Yes, of course. We naturally have start-up capital, though not very much. But interest on our financial resources deposited in banks should become the principal source of financing the union's activity. This is the main income item. The second item of financing is practical work. We plan to spend part of the funds to purchase some production equipment. Perhaps a bakery, or a small shop processing wood, or meat and

dairy products. Our specialists are studying the possibility of signing agreements with some kolkhoz or sovkhoz, or a commercial farm. The shop could be leased, and we could be its co-owners. There are already several ways we can go.

One other source is to lease the equipment given to us by the Germans. I am referring in particular to motor vehicles of the former East German Army. I am also certain that we will get some attention from sponsors. Russian and German. We will be grateful for all manifestations of humanitarianism. The traditions of charity are alive, as we have already persuaded ourselves. Discussing the friends of our union, let me mention some of them. There are Mr. Z. Zanden, president of the German-Russian Chamber of Commerce, Mr. M. Buder, director of a German firm, Ms. Ye. Shtrube, chairman of the board of the Saxony-Anhalt-Russia Friendship Society, and I. Kalashnik, general director of the Expo-Invest Company.

[Pashayev] Who is working permanently in the union today? Won't it happen that a huge administration will eat up a substantial share of the resources the union possesses?

[Burlakov] Of course not. We have now nominated and appointed the union's executive director on a competitive basis. He is a reserve colonel, a former chief of staff of the rear services of the Moscow Air Defense District, and a competent, experienced administrator. He has been instructed to select a treasurer-accountant and a business manager for himself. This administration has its own vehicle, so add a driver to this list. The wages of all of them are extremely modest, which is why I don't even exclude the possibility that these people will have to take second jobs.

[Pashayev] Is the ZGV (GSFG) Veteran's Union already carrying out humanitarian actions? If so, please give an example.

[Burlakov] I wouldn't refer to what we do as actions. Recently we provided material assistance to a young officer's family that sought the services of German doctors in connection with a seriously ill child. Help has been provided in solving the housing problem for several especially poor families. Unfortunately, I must repeat that our possibilities are extremely limited for the moment—the union hasn't yet begun working at full power. We are currently analyzing the mail, creating a data bank, and making plans for the future in accordance with our possibilities.

[Pashayev] One last question. How do those who want to become members of the union make contact with its representatives? Who can answer questions from people who are interested?

[Burlakov] Our work goes on through grass-roots organizations operating in military units withdrawn from

Germany. In those regions where such units are nonexistent, check with oblast military commissariats: We have sent them the corresponding explanatory letters and union documents.

We will be opening our office in Moscow very soon. We will certainly communicate its address and telephone number to readers of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA.

Kremlin Elite Army Unit Rumored

944F1429A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 30 Aug 94 pp 1-2

[Article by Vadim Yegorov: "The Kremlin Has Backed Off From an Open Confrontation With the Commander of the 14th Army; The President of Russia Has Been Forced To Reckon With the Opposition Mood in the Army"]

[Text] So the first results of Boris Yeltsin's Sochi consultations with Aleksandr Kozhakov, in the course of which the Russian president conclusively determined with the aid of the chief of his Security Service the tactics and strategy of operations for the immediate political future, are on hand. Far from Moscow's bustle and Kremlin intrigues, important decisions, many of which will form the basis of a new approach to the set of problems connected with the power ministries and departments of Russia, were made.

One of the main decisions was that Lt. Gen. Aleksandr Lebed, commander of the 14th Army, will remain at his post. The commander was notified of this by the defense minister personally at a meeting of the two generals held in Pavel Grachev's administrative office on 26 August. There was hereby a happy ending to a noisy epic tale that had throughout recent weeks aroused the country's public opinion and initiated the latest campaign of criticism of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation and its leadership in the mass media. Following the meeting, General Lebed expressed satisfaction at its results and considered closed the conflict with the defense minister that had begun to show. In order to save face, Pavel Grachev announced that there would, nonetheless, be a certain reduction in the administrative staff of the formation deployed in the Dniester region and that the Army itself would be renamed Group of Russian Troops. He confirmed that there would be no further attempts to find new postings for General Lebed.

What conclusions should be drawn from this sensational business? The first was drawn earlier by NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA (see the issue for 17 August of this year): Following last year's October events, some Russian generals have shaken off the unquestioning-fulfillment-of-an-order syndrome. Before our eyes, an ordinary commander of a combined-arms army publicly refused to comply with a directive of the General Staff determining the procedure of organizational-staff measures in the administrative machinery and the operational units. Lebed demonstrated a readiness for decisive

actions and an unwillingness to compromise. In addition, by the mere fact of his possible resignation and its consequences, he essentially blackmailed the authorities. The first to understand this was the president, whose political reputation would in this case have sustained colossal damage. According to reports of the arms of military counterintelligence of the Federal Counterintelligence Service of the Russian Federation, the Army could, in the event of Lebed's removal, simply have stopped taking orders from Moscow and have switched to a mode of autonomous operation. It was for this reason that, in the course of Boris Yeltsin's Volga tour, the Russian president's well-known statement of support for the commander of the 14th Army was heard.

It has to be plainly acknowledged that Lieutenant General Lebed is a courageous individual and a commander that is deserving in the highest degree. It remains merely to be regretted that it was not he that was commanding the Northwest Group of Troops, the final act of the shameful withdrawal of the remnants of which from Latvia and Estonia has now been completed. Alas, in the presence of the president, practically all Russian generals lose the gift of speech. And, as a result, treaties whose fulfillment will be detrimental to the interests of the national security of the Russian Federation are being made ready for Boris Yeltsin's signature.

General Lebed has been appeased once again. The self-preservation instinct prompted Boris Yeltsin to make the right move—to leave everything as it has been thus far. But, Pavel Grachev, via the instrumentality of whom the Kremlin planned to settle scores with the commander, has found himself in an awkward position. He has been crudely exposed. The press has shaken the defense minister's name about furiously, accusing him of a desire to make short shrift of the fractious army commander, although Grachev was merely the obedient executant of the will of others.

At this stage, the president has been forced to take account of the opposition mood in the Army. The Armed Forces are suffocating under a load of problems that have assumed a protracted, chronic nature. There is no money, housing, or prospects. The financial noose thrown by the government around the throat of the Army and the military-industrial complex is bringing about irreversible changes and the collapse of the military potential and the defense works. Over 60 percent of officer's families are living on the verge of poverty. The present leadership of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation is not in a position to confront the president with these matters, even at the price of its own resignation. Whereas Aleksandr Lebed's mouth has been closed at least for a while, what is to be done with the officer corps of the Armed Forces—no one knows. An explosion of discontent could ensue at any moment. For this reason, the Kremlin is banking on the creation of palace elite forces. The long-standing idea of the formation of a presidential guard is in the practical development phase. The details are not known, but it is a

question in general form of the deployment in direct proximity to Moscow of a number of the units withdrawn from Germany and the Baltic countries. It is on the basis of these and also on the basis of certain divisions of separate brigades (and regiments) of the Moscow Military District that a presidential guard will be formed. These troops will be part of the overall Armed Forces, but will in an operational respect be reserved to a deputy defense minister (as an alternative) or a command that has been formed specially. It is planned to give the personnel of the presidential units increased pay, and the officers, warrant officers, and contract soldiers will within a year obtain well-appointed accommodations. In the event that Boris Yeltsin chooses to abandon presidential elections, the accelerated creation of his personal guard will switch from theoretical efforts to the practical phase. A number of analysts, incidentally, see the recent appointment of Matvey Burlakov as a prologue to his breakthrough to far higher spheres, namely, the role of commander of the presidential guard.

The tactics of strengthening the other power structures, primarily the Main Security Directorate, the president's Security Service, the MVD internal forces, and the Federal Government Communications and Information Agency, continue against the background of the current malaise in the Army. Their officers are being made aware of the president's favor via substantial salaries and a mass of privileges accompanying them. At the same time, changes in the leadership of the power ministries and departments are, as before, more than likely. The simple performance of one's professional duty to the extent of the functional obligations in terms of the position held is not enough for the president. Something more is required—a constant demonstration of loyal feelings.

POLICY

Lebed Returns to 14th Army, Tiraspol

94UM0585D Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY
in Russian 16 Aug 94 p 3

[Article by Ilya Bulavinov: "Boris Yeltsin Defended a Disobedient General: General Lebed Returns to Tiraspol"]

[Text] As KOMMERSANT-DAILY predicted, the early return of Lieutenant General Aleksandr Lebed from leave to Tiraspol caused a major change in the situation of the 14th Army. The first thing the decisive army commander did was to suspend fulfillment of Pavel Grachev's directives on reforming the army administration. He did this contrary to orders. By doing so, he made it known that he did not intend to give up, and that he was ready to take any action, even open disobedience of the higher command. And yesterday he was actually supported by Boris Yeltsin, who declared that actions that may aggravate the situation in the Dnestr region were "contrary to Russia's interests."

Upon arriving in Tiraspol Saturday evening, General Lebed announced that there was only one way to interpret Defense Minister Pavel Grachev's directive liquidating the administration of the 14th Army—"as the best way to set off an explosion in the region, as a crime." Giving Lebed his due, it must be said that rather than concerning himself with his personal role in history, he immediately turned to the concerns of his subordinates, and to the consequences which the changes in the 14th Army could produce according to his data. As far as the fate of the General himself is concerned, Lebed did not dwell on the political intrigues of the Russian military department, saying only that in his opinion the blame for the current situation lies not with the Minister, not with the General Staff, and not with the Main Commissariat of Ground Troops, but with some invisible "forces close to the Ministry." In addition the Army Commander confirmed that if the army administration is reduced and reorganized after all, he would retire.

Lebed's refusal last Saturday to follow the ministerial directive looked like a passive form of military mutiny. Moreover according to information coming to KOMMERSANT-DAILY Lebed's decision was met with understanding and approval by army officers. However, by as early as Monday Boris Yeltsin, who spoke for the first time since the problem arose, actually supported Lebed, stating to Interfaks that it would be impermissible "to artificially aggravate the situation in the Dnestr region" by any actions and decisions at all.

Lebed's stated opponent Pavel Grachev finds himself in an extremely difficult position after such words by the President. The Minister will now have to rectify the situation; Lebed himself suggested a solution: Grachev, who had been vacationing in Sochi all this time, and remained silent, could easily accuse his assistants of mismanagement and carelessness. He would then of course be admitting his own defeat, and he will probably sacrifice some general who will shoulder all the blame.

Thus the first decisive attempt by the leadership of the Russian Ministry of Defense to get rid of Lebed ended in failure. The President's support may guarantee the Army Commander's security for a certain while, of course, but obviously Grachev, who has now been wounded, and who now feels, besides everything else, that Lebed has his eyes on the minister's chair, will hardly cease his attempts to fetter his disobedient subordinate. It may be that the struggle against Lebed will now assume the form of behind-the-scenes administrative games, and will shift to the corridors of the Kremlin, where Lebed should feel must less comfortable than in Tiraspol.

As far as General Lebed himself is concerned, he has recently been swiftly gaining political support, and not just among officers alone; he continues to avoid direct answers to questions regarding his prospects for gaining the ministerial and perhaps even the presidential chair. But most likely this is evidence not of the general's inertia but of his patience and his ability to consider all possible variants of the development of events.

Kokoshin Stresses Importance of Military Science

MM0209143194 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 2 Sep 94 p 1

["Own Information" report "From Official Sources":
"What We Expect of Military Science"]

[Text] In an interview with KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in connection with the creation of the Academy of Military Sciences, First Deputy Defense Minister Andrey Kokoshin noted the great significance of the development of military science for the organizational development of the Russian Armed Forces, the national defense industry potential, and the quest for optimum solutions in the military-political and military-economic sphere and for a whole series of other problems that the state leadership and the Defense Ministry leadership have to resolve.

Defense Minister General of the Army P.S. Grachev has repeatedly noted that reform of the Armed Forces and their organizational development may not be the business of the Defense Ministry alone and that this is a statewide, national task, Andrey Kokoshin said.

At the same time serious, sober military-historical work is very important, the first deputy defense minister pointed out. Of late, despite all the difficulties that our science is experiencing, a whole series of major works on this subject have appeared in our country, including works prepared under the auspices of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences by academics from the Defense Ministry's Institute of Military History. Plenty has been done recently to ensure a more in-depth study of the Great Patriotic War.

More and more important details and previously unknown fragments of history are being uncovered, without which the picture remains not only incomplete but partially distorted. More and more memoirs of prominent Russian and Soviet military chiefs and participants in major historical events in the history of the Great Patriotic War are being printed.

Of the recent works on the history of the Great Patriotic War, the first deputy defense minister drew attention in particular to an article in VOYENNAYA MYSL by Army General M.A. Gareyev on the reasons for and lessons learned from the Western Front offensive operations during the winter of 1943 and 1944.

Andrey Kokoshin pointed out that the public must also be provided with timely information about the results of major military-historical studies.

Likely End of Moscow PVO District

94UM0585C Moscow MOSKOVSKIY
KOMSOMOLETS in Russian 20 Aug 94 p 1

[Article by Dmitriy Kholodov: "The Last Ring: Military Districts Dying at Forty..."]

[Text] This year the Moscow Air Defense District is simply deluged with history-making events. The latest automated system was adopted by a presidential edict. Rearmament of the air defense ring closest to Moscow (the 50-kilometer ring) with S-300 missile systems has been completed. And today the district is 40 years old. It appears that this year will also be its last. A truth of the market economy: He who can't pay his own way won't survive. The district is already 100 billion rubles in debt. And it will not survive the planned reorganization: The officers are already speaking about this openly, on the record. The reorganization foresees mothballing of the equipment, by which the missiles and electronics will be interred "until better times."

But reduction of the army is not the problem. A directive handed down from above scheduling the reorganization was not coordinated with the district headquarters. As always happens with us, everything was decided by higher administrative bodies.

This reorganization "from above" will most likely cost the taxpayer a tidy sum. Even so, in the opinion of specialists there is no guarantee that all of the equipment will be dependably preserved. Upon making some calculations and despairing at the results, the district went to the military scientific research institutes and offered its own "reform program"—one not calling for mothballing of the equipment. The district headquarters was ready to carry it out, as being something that it could afford. But of course, it was turned down. "The district's opinion was ignored," Colonel General Anatoliy Kornukov, the district commander, openly announced in a holiday press conference. This was even though his program turned out to be more economical (by approximately R60-70 billion). This is with regard for the district's debts and for the fact that money was not being allocated for the reforms.

The birthday turned out to be a gloomy one. And probably the holiday will generally pass for a funeral in the air defense military garrisons. The editor's office of MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS has received numerous appeals and complaints regarding the personal repercussions from closing of the units of Moscow Air Defense District located in the Moscow region. The air defense military posts were always built in remote areas—the "rings" are still top secret. (Many Muscovites are now receiving land parcels in places where concrete strips—former missile launch positions, the number of which has now been reduced—were poured far from all housing.) These remaining "bear's lairs" are a real Golgotha for the district command. In any case despite all of the legislative acts, the rayon administrations in the Moscow area are in no hurry to accept the reigns of government from the district in these settlements.

The commander is not opposed to reduction. He is seen by other officers to be a person with democratic leanings. But judging from his rather rigid position, the situation is truly extreme—everything can come falling down.

"We are presently at that limit beyond which a significant decrease in security will occur," the general told journalists. He confirmed a report by MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS that on 13 July, when a suicide pilot flew over Moscow in a transport aircraft, he was the first to issue a combat order to the district: to shoot the airplane down if it crossed into the Moscow air defense zone. And the air defense rings would certainly have done their job. "For now, Muscovites can sleep peacefully," the commander asserted, placing emphasis on the words "for now." But this peacefulness is associated more likely today with the fact that no one is threatening the Russian FOR NOW. Very soon this "umbrella" may close, despite the existing presidential edict on creation of the Aerospace Defense Forces.

After Desert Storm, they are excellently aware in Iraq that the future lies in high-precision weapons. If this concept is in any way applicable to the Russian Army, then it is so to the air defense rings of Moscow. And with all due respect to the Ministry of Defense, we are very reluctant to lose them as wastefully as we lost the unified air defense system of the former USSR, which was simply sold for scrap. AIR, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

Journalist Visits North Caucasus Air Force Base

MM0609100394 Moscow TRUD in Russian 3 Sep 94 p 1

[Report by special correspondent Yuriy Dmitriyev: "Flying Past?... Reportage From a Transcaucasian Air Force Garrison"]

[Excerpt] Air Base "X," North Caucasus— It has always been interesting to visit Air Force garrisons, particularly the long-range aviation pilots in jet fighter regiments. The exemplary order displayed there was pleasing: Well-maintained military barracks, complete with flower beds; festive posters at the entrance to the officers' club; roomy, high-standard apartments with all mod cons; and tables with white tablecloths, where appetizing dinners were served with extra rations of juice, caviar, chocolate, and fruit.

Where has all this suddenly disappeared to? A few days ago we visited a garrison which has taken shelter in a former training center's facility in the North Caucasus. Airmen have transferred there from Germany and the Baltic countries: two of our elite combat regiments, a ground-attack regiment with its formidable Su-25's, and a fighter regiment with its lightning-fast MIG-29's. The aircrew—mainly pilots first class, although there are also pilots-expert marksmen—are well trained. Many of them served in Afghanistan and have combat decorations to show for it.

It is no accident that these regiments have appeared on Russia's extreme southern borders, which have been ill-defended since the collapse of the Union. The country has been deprived of its main air defense bases in the Transcaucasus. But here you still have restless Chechnya with a constant threat of Russian aircraft and helicopters being downed....

We watched the ground-attack planes practise their combat training tasks. Early in the morning black, snub-nosed fuel-tankers appeared on the runway and the armory service smartly brought up missiles, bombs, and shells on their metal transporter trailers. The flight mechanics checked the aircraft systems and equipment. Regimental Commander Colonel Petr Iyevlev, and his jaunty, energetic deputy in charge of flying, Lieutenant Colonel Tofik Sultanov, a native of Dagestan, checked the flight readiness of every pilot. Fuel is at a premium at the base—there are stocks sufficient for only two-three days. It has to be used sparingly. Every minute of air time must be used to maximum benefit.

The tasks set by the commander are of great diversity: To reconnoiter the area of ravines, to follow the windy mountain paths and report back by radio any targets detected, and to locate armored equipment convoys moving through the narrow, deserted stony tracts, and defensive positions. And, of course, to carry out bombing raids and missile strikes. All this at present involves simulated targets and firing training. But if a real fighting situation does develop, you won't envy the "enemy"....

The next day saw the supersonic MiG-29's in the air. They were taken up by Division Commander Colonel Aleksandr Zelin, who has the title "pilot-expert marksman," and the regimental commander, who is also an expert marksman, Colonel Vladimir Griga. The daring pirouettes executed in the sky by these guys had to be seen, it was as if we were at an air display at Kubinka rather than an ordinary field airstrip. These included a climbing roll, a loop with split S, and a chandelle followed by a dive. We could see bright lights—these were the afterburners glowing. The Mig-29 is a reliable defender of the Russian skies. Its fairing cleverly houses a rapid-fire cannon, and guided missiles are mounted on the underwing pylons. Rockets are also carried. In short, we have the means to thwart the attempts of anyone intruding into our parts with ill intent.

While we were at the Air Force garrison the presidential plane, carrying the head of state who was visiting the region, appeared in the southern skies of Russia several times. As is appropriate in the case of top-security flights, the garrison was in a state of enhanced combat readiness. Two fighters were drawn up on the runway in readiness—the ground-attack squadron commanders were on alert duty. If any unforeseen circumstances had arisen, they were ready to take resolute action. Fortunately, that was not needed. [passage omitted]

NAVAL FORCES

Su-27K Fighter Squadron Arrives Aboard Admiral Kuznetsov

MM3108081794 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1900 GMT 27 Aug 94

[From the "Vesti" newscast: Video report from aboard Admiral Kuznetsov in the Barents Sea by A. Filippov,

identified by caption; figures in brackets denote broadcast time in GMT in hours, minutes, and seconds]

[Text] [191401] [Filippov over aerial views of Admiral Kuznetsov from helicopter] An important, not to say historic, event for Russia's Navy has taken place in the Barents Sea aboard the flagship Admiral Kuznetsov.

The aircraft-carrying cruiser received aboard the first pilots of a regular Su-27K fighter squadron. Training sessions for landing on this deck took place for a number of years in the Crimea. You can take it from me that it is not at all easy to locate this relatively small airfield in the ocean and to touch down on an area the size of a handkerchief. But this is exactly what these air aces have done. The traditional welcome involves flowers and what is known as "bumps." [video shows pilots being thrown up in the air]. The aircraft carrier Kuznetsov is the pride of Russia's Navy. The ship which knows no defeat and which is capable of performing combat tasks in any part of the world ocean has now received its main weapon—fighter aircraft.

The flagship's commander, Captain First Rank Ivan Sanko, is confident about the potential of his vessel and its crew. The same could be said about the NATO reconnaissance vessel which is shadowing the cruiser day and night, despite the thaw in the international climate. As the saying goes, friendship is friendship but military service is a different matter. The cruiser which is called upon to perform exclusively defensive tasks is attracting close attention from around the world.

And this is how the pilots themselves evaluate today's event.

[Unidentified pilot] Today I am simply proud of our motherland. Proud not of myself or my colleague here, or of our regiment, but of our motherland. For the first time we have genuine carrier-borne aviation.

[Filippov] The command and the pilots' tutors rated high the pilots' skill and the work of the ship's crew. We would like to wish them plenty of water under their keel and peaceful skies. [191518] [video shows aerial view of Admiral Kuznetsov, Su-27K touching down and taking off, ship's crew below deck, commander, pilots' welcome, interview, surveillance ship]

Future of Baltic Fleet

944F1338A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 17 Aug 94 p 3

[Article by Nikolay Plotnikov, military observer of NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA: "The Baltic Fleet Has Been Preserved in Spite of All the Problems. "But the Sailors Need the State's Assistance"]

[Text]

Historical Digression

The Russian Baltic Fleet was formed by Peter I. It was built under the conditions of incessant hostilities. With

the assistance of the Baltic Fleet, Russian troops captured at the time of the Northern War (1700-1721) the Vyborg Fortress, the ports of Revel (present-day Tallinn), Riga, and Pernov (Parnu), and the Muhu Vain Islands. At sea the young Russian fleet won victories in the Hango engagement, at the Battle of Ezel, and off Grengam. This enabled Russia to establish itself firmly in the Baltic and become an important naval power. During the Russo-Turkish wars of the latter half of the 18th and the start of the 19th centuries, the Baltic Fleet formed several squadrons that were dispatched to the Mediterranean to fight the Turkish fleet. They won big victories in the Chesma, Athos, and Navarin engagements. The Baltic Fleet was the ancestor of the Black Sea Fleet, and in the course of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, the 1st and 2d Pacific squadrons were formed from the Baltic Fleet.

An important place in the activity of the Baltic Fleet has been occupied by round-the-world and long-distance navigation for scientific purposes, which were initiated by the first Russian round-the-world expedition of 1803-1806 on the ships *Nadezhda* and *Neva* under the command of Admiral Ivan Fedorovich Kruzenshtern.

During WWI the Baltic Fleet foiled all the Germans' attempts to break through into the gulfs of Finland and Riga, defended the Aland Islands, and protected Petrograd from the sea. In September-October 1917, the sailors of the Baltic Fleet inflicted considerable losses on the German fleet in the course of the Muhu Vain operation and prevented the possibility of its breaking through to the capital of Russia.

The Baltic Fleet operated successfully during the Great Patriotic War also. In August 1941, even, the fleet's long-range bombers were making the first assaults on Berlin. In the initial period of the war, the Baltic Fleet tied down large forces of German troops for a long time by its dogged defense of Tallinn, the Muhu Vain Islands, and the Hango Naval Base. It accomplished major assignments in the battle for Leningrad and secured transportation for the city, which was blocked by land, across Lake Ladoga. In the operations of Soviet forces in 1944-1945, the Baltic Fleet contributed to the smashing of the enemy in the Baltic, Eastern Prussia, and Eastern Pomerania. In the war years the sailors of the Baltic Fleet sank 280 ships and auxiliary craft and 320 transport ships of the enemy. For high military skill, stanchness, and courage, 137 persons were awarded the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union, four of them twice.

In 1946 the Baltic Fleet was divided into two independent fleets—the 4th and the 8th. In December 1955 the former organization was restored. The forces of the fleet were deployed on the territory of Russia, the three Baltic republics, Belorussia, Germany, and Poland. With the collapse of the Union, ordeals comparable, perhaps, only with the start of the Great Patriotic War fell to the lot of the sailors of the Baltic Fleet and their families.

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Exodus

Following the well-known events of 1991, a large amount of work on withdrawal from the Baltic was added to the forces of the fleet being withdrawn from Germany and Poland. It was necessary in a short space of time to redeploy to the territory of Russia and to decide the future of over 18,000 servicemen and to transport approximately 200,000 tonnes of stocks of logistical supplies and several thousand items of motor transport and specialized equipment. Hardly anyone had calculated what a sum such an exodus of the fleet, unparalleled anywhere in the world, has cost the country. According to officers' rough calculations, just one trip of a large landing craft to carry property from the Tallinn Naval Base to Baltiysk costs R50 million. And how many trips have there been altogether? Several dozen, it has to be thought. Astronomical costs.

Distressing reflections are induced also by the values of what we left behind, from bases and naval stations through elements of the airfield network. The fleet has handed over to the local authorities of the Baltic states alone 136 military camps and 2,299 buildings worth a sum total of over R50 billion in 1984 prices. And a paltry sum was obtained from the sale of property locally—just R851.239 million and \$153,000.

The material losses sustained by the state as a result of the uncivilized withdrawal not only of the Baltic Fleet but also of the Northwestern Group of Forces are enormous, and some are, it has to be said plainly, irreparable. The damage sustained by the country in terms of military security in the northwest region is a separate subject. And what value can be put on the moral humiliations that Russian servicemen and their families have experienced not only from national radicals but from the authorities of the Baltic states also? Hundreds of examples could be given. Russia has had to pay for the collapse of a great power not only with hard cash but also with the tears of its citizens.

Despite the extreme conditions under which the sailors of the Baltic Fleet had been placed and the incessant moral and psychological pressure, the withdrawal of the Baltic Fleet to Russia had essentially been completed by 31 May of this year. Small liquidation commissions have remained in Liepaja and Tallinn for a certain length of time. Some 80 ships and 157 support ships have been withdrawn, and more than 350 units and subunits have been redeployed, inactivated, and reformed. Judging by the statements of the Baltic Fleet command, the fate of the majority of officers and warrant officers has already been determined. A substantial part of them will continue to serve in the Baltic. Some 820 persons have, at their own request, been transferred to other fleets, units of the center, and other branches of the armed forces, and also to the armies of states of the CIS and the Baltic. This work is not yet complete. Adm Vladimir Yegorov, commander of the Baltic Fleet, has set his personnel arms the precise assignment of checking the fortunes of each individual.

The withdrawal of the forces has seriously exacerbated the housing problem. The Baltic Fleet's housing in the Baltic constituted 47 percent of the total, that is, almost half the families have been left without a roof over their heads. In deciding the political fate of the fleet, the politicians yet again failed to give any thought as to where people would live, heaping a solution of the problem on the military itself. It was planned withdrawing more than 6,000 families from the Baltic countries. Over 5,000 have already been withdrawn. Housing has already been provided for 792 of them. It is planned having built before the end of this year for the servicemen being withdrawn a further 343 apartments and obtaining 639 places in hostels. In addition, the fleet command also has to resolve the problem of the servicemen who were released into the reserve in 1993-1994 and who are currently living in the Baltic. And this means more than 1,000 families. According to NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA information, it is planned purchasing for them in Russia this year more than 300 apartments. We have to add also to the servicemen who are being withdrawn those who have been waiting for years for a roof over their heads while serving on Russian territory. Much is being done by the fleet command. For example, thanks to the well-known Baltflot-Selma project, 270 officer and warrant officer families recently held housewarming parties. But neither the fleet nor the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation can solve the housing question by themselves. Real and specific assistance of the state is needed.

Operational Training Continues, Despite Problems

Comparatively recently the *Neustrashimyy* escort ship took part in the Baltops NATO naval exercises in the Baltic. In the course of the exercises, NATO servicemen were interested no longer in the ship and its operational possibilities, but in our boys' morale and psychological condition: Did the Russians love their motherland as before, their attitude toward military service, commitment to the naval cause, desire to put to sea as often as possible. In the estimation of the foreign military specialists, the Russian sailors performed all assignments successfully. And, on account of the shortage of personnel, the *Neustrashimyy's* crew had a heavy workload. The manning shortfall in men on compulsory military service is one of the Baltic Fleet's most acute problems. Earlier, the ships were manned 80-85 percent. Crews preparing for long-distance cruises were frequently manned over and above the personnel allowance. Now, however, even ships that are in permanent readiness have the absolute minimum of personnel.

On account of the strained fuel and lubricants situation, the number of long-distance cruises and deployments has declined, and the intensity of the sailings has diminished. The sailors have been forced to economize on each tonne of fuel and each kilogram of oil. Even the specialist realizes that warfare cannot be taught without practice at sea. The Baltic Fleet command and the officer corps should be given their due: Combat training is taking

place, and is taking place full bore. Under the current forced conditions, the emphasis has been put on base training. In the estimation of Vice Admiral Viktor Litvinov, deputy commander of the Baltic Fleet for operational training, the planned measures of the operational training schedule are being performed in full and opportunely, in the main. Although in terms of the complexity of the combat drills and their number, today's training does, of course, on account of the said factors, lose out to that of past years.

This is the difficult situation in which sailors of the Baltic Fleet are performing their functional duties in safeguarding the military security and the interests of Russia in the Baltic. According to foreign press estimates, the combat readiness of the Baltic Fleet, despite the whole raft of problems, is sufficient for the accomplishment of the operational assignments that confront them. As a whole, it may be affirmed that, in spite of all the problems, the Baltic Fleet has been preserved as an operational-strategic formation of the armed forces of Russia.

Future of the Russian Baltic Fleet

There has been a fundamental change in the geopolitical situation in the Baltic in recent years. In accordance with the military doctrine and naval strategy of Russia, the Baltic Fleet is earmarked under the new conditions for the protection of the state military-political and economic interests and the security of Russia in the Baltic region in peacetime and in wartime. In peacetime this mission amounts to maintenance of the established combat readiness of the fleet, the exercise in conjunction with the border forces of control of the territorial waters and the economic zone, and the safeguarding of production activity and the safety of navigation. In wartime the fleet must be ready to repel an enemy attack, from wherever it may come, and to protect the interests and security of Russia in armed fashion. A most important mission of the Baltic Fleet in wartime will be the defense of Kaliningrad Oblast—an enclave part of Russia isolated from its main territory and its armed forces.

Structurally, the fleet will include two groupings: the southern grouping, based in Kaliningrad Oblast, and the northern grouping, which will include the Leningrad Naval Base. The fleet will be controlled, as before, from

Kaliningrad. It is planned that the reform of the Baltic Fleet for the new assignments will have been completed by 1 January 1995. It is contemplated that it will by this time have switched to a new structural and quantitative and qualitative composition, in the main. Additional difficulties in connection with this distinctive disconnection of the formation into two groupings that are practically isolated from each other have appeared in coverage of the situation at sea and in the air and underwater environment and in the hydrometeorological and navigational-hydrographic support for the cruising of ships and vessels. Specifically, as far as the latter point is concerned, according to fleet officers, with the handover of the navigation facilities to the Baltic states, the corresponding vessels included, they are falling into decay before our eyes. Going by sea in the Irbenskiy Strait, which is most complex for navigation, or along the Estonian coast is becoming dangerous.

On the whole, though, in specialists' opinion, the controllability of the Baltic Fleet has, given the modern means of communication, been preserved, and the spatial distance of the force groupings from one another should not have a great influence on the efficiency of their operations in the Baltic. Practice will in time show, for that matter, what adjustments need to be made to the structure of the Baltic Fleet.

PEACEKEEPING FORCES

Additional 600 Peacekeepers Sent to Abkhazia

94UM0572G Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 23 Aug 94 p 1

[Article by Leonid Pozdeyev: "Ural Volunteers Bring Peace to Abkhazia"]

[Text] Another Russian peacekeeping battalion has been sent to Abkhazia. Six hundred volunteers, service members of the Ural Military District, flew in aircraft of Military Transport Aviation from the Koltsovo Airport to Sukhumi.

As part of the Peace-Keeping Forces, they are to guard roads and communications. As reported by Acting Chief of Staff of the District, Maj-Gen Anatoliy Kosenko, the Ural battalion of "blue helmets" will be garrisoned in Kodor canyon.

INTERREGIONAL MILITARY ISSUES

Joint Ukraine-Belarus Railroad Troops Exercise, Radetskyy Remarks

94UM0551A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
10 Aug 94 p 1

[Article by NARODNA ARMIYA correspondent Senior Lieutenant Ruslan Tkachuk]

[Text] A joint tactical-special exercise by Ukrainian and Belarusian railroad troops, as was already announced in our newspaper, was held on August 5 under the supervision of the Minister of Defense, and concluded with the erection of a floating railroad bridge across the Desna River in the area of the city of Chernihiv.

The Minister of Defense had a high assessment of the actions of the military railroad troops, and expressed gratitude to Minister of Defense of the Republic of Belarus Colonel-General Anatoliy Kostenko for the participation of a subunit from the Armed Forces of Belarus in the exercise. He emphasized in his address that the tactical-special exercise was a fine example of collaboration between the military agencies of the two nations.

General of the Army of Ukraine Vitaliy Radetskyy also sent a telegram with the results of the exercise addressed to the chairman of the Chernihiv Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies, Petro Shapoval, and the mayor of Chernihiv, Vitaliy Kosykh. The Minister of Defense thanked the workers of the oblast for the great assistance they provided to the Armed Forces of Ukraine during the exercise. That concern for the military is a manifestation of the good relations between the leadership of the oblast and the military units. The telegram expressed the conviction that those good relations would be comprehensively developed and strengthened.

The Minister of Defense answered a number of questions from journalists after the completion of the exercise.

[Question] Vitaliy Hryhorovych, the mass media of a certain bent have lately been talking about, if one may say, the lack of fighting ability of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. How do you evaluate the training of the troops today?

[Radetskyy] The press exists in a democratic state in order to express various ideas. Even when some of the mass media provide coverage that is not objective, it has a positive aspect as well, in my opinion, since it forces the military to work better still. I would stress, with regard to the fighting ability of the Army, that we are fulfilling the plan for combat training approved by the President of the nation and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. We are maintaining the combat readiness of the troops at a suitable level, even in the face of the difficult economic situation. Today's exercise of the railroad troops is the best proof of that.

There are, without doubt, many problems in the Army today. We are worried about money, fuel, housing construction (more than 72,000 servicemen are not provided with housing today), and doubtless the miserable pay for the officer corps for their work. I had a conversation with the president of Ukraine on this score, and he assured me that positive changes are forthcoming on this plane in the near future.

[Question] Ukraine has adopted the status of a nuclear power. How is nuclear disarmament proceeding in practice today?

[Radetskyy] The trilateral agreement pertaining to nuclear potential is being fulfilled completely, and within the designated deadlines, by both the Russian and the Ukrainian parties. The United States is letting us down—much less funding than was envisaged has been allocated so far. U.S. Vice President Albert Gore, who recently made an official visit to Ukraine, has provided assurances that the Americans will move from word to deed in the near future.

[Question] Does the Military Doctrine of Ukraine conform to the realities of the day? Perhaps certain changes are envisaged in its provisions?

[Radetskyy] The Military Doctrine corresponded entirely to the situation at the time it was adopted. Today a review of some of its elements, and in particular those that pertain to the nonmembership of Ukraine in alliances, would seem to be possible. Experience shows that it is harder to survive alone these days. We must remember a simple truth as well—when there is peace in your neighbor's house, there is harmony in your own.

[Question] Vitaliy Hryhorovych, how is the problem of the Black Sea Fleet being resolved? Are any substantial shifts on that issue expected in the near future?

[Radetskyy] A commission of Russian experts is coming to Ukraine on August 17; the devising of provisions on dividing up the boats of the Black Sea fleet will begin then. I feel that all will be resolved on a civilized basis, without diminishing the role of either of the parties.

The problems of both the Ukrainian Navy and the Black Sea Fleet will be taken into account. The solutions will be adopted with a view to historical traditions, and the fate of the professional sailors and their families.

UKRAINE

1994 Conscription Activity Assessed

94UM0545A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
9 Aug 94 p 1

[Article by NARODNA ARMIYA commentator Serhiy Zhurets under the rubric "Draft-94": "Better To Mow With a Scythe at Home Than To Carry a Knapsack in the Army?"]

[Text] The plan for drafting citizens for conscript military service that ran from March through June of this year was fulfilled by 108 percent, reported the Main Organizational-Mobilization Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Physically strong and competent replacements were sent to the troops, and are ready to fulfill properly their sacred duty to protect their Fatherland.

The draft was conducted, in accordance with the Law of Ukraine "Universal Military Obligation and Military Service," jointly by the bodies of local administration and local self-government, with the assistance of representatives of public organizations and the collectives of enterprises and organizations.

Words of gratitude can also be directed today, with completion of the draft, to the workers of the military commissariats of the Republic of Crimea and Luhansk, Dnipropetrovsk, Vinnytsya and Khmelnytskyi oblasts. Their commissariats have devoted constant attention to work on preparing the youth for service, close ties have been established with the local authorities, and they study the moral and practical qualities of the draftees.

The truth is that it should also be mentioned that the Kirovohrad, Kharkiv, Lviv and Rivne military commissariats worked below their capabilities this time. The difficulties in the conduct of the draft in those oblasts were conditioned to a considerable extent by problems in upholding prevailing legislation among the military commissariats in organizing the frame of mind of the draftees, which led to the appearance of youth who are evading the draft.

The address the specific indicators are as follows after the completion of the spring draft. Approximately 33 percent of the youth who came to the draft commissions ended up in the troops. That is, one out of three youths in Ukraine is in military uniform in Ukraine. The rest receive deferments owing to the state of their health or family circumstances, as well as studying at schools or institutes. There were considerably more such youth in the spring, since it is namely then that the recruiting for educational institutions occurs.

Close to five thousand youth, regardless of warnings, did not show up at all at the draft offices, thereby violating the law "Universal Military Obligation and Military Service," which, incidentally, has not conformed not only to its name, but also, in the opinion of military experts, to the requirements of the state as well since its very approval.

And finally, I would point out that four years ago, when Ukraine considered its own army to be just a dream, I went during a leave to Lviv from Novosibirsk. An announcement was hung on a tree in Lviv at the track near the Opera Theater, which said "The Lviv Committee for the Creation of Ukrainian Armed Forces is calling upon youth of draft age to register, for the purpose of facilitating the defense of the rights of the

inhabitants of Lviv and the oblast to perform military service on the territory of Ukraine. The place of registration is the headquarters of the People's Rukh of Ukraine, Rynok Square, 8."

You couldn't get into the rooms at Rynok Square, 8 then—there were so many who wanted to serve on the territory of Ukraine.

Will those times ever return?

Commissions Discuss Nuclear Energy, Disarmament, Export Controls

94UM0551C Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
12 Aug 94 p 1

[Item from Inf. "NA": "At the Commissions of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine"]

[Text] The Commission on Issues of Nuclear Policy and Nuclear Security, our correspondent has learned, has completed the preliminary refinement of the draft laws submitted by the Cabinet of Ministers titled "The Utilization of Nuclear Power and Radiation Protection" and "Handling Radioactive Wastes." The articles of the draft legislation are now being coordinated with the conceptual framework adopted by parliament for the safe utilization of nuclear power and the state administration of the sector.

The Commission on Issues of Defense and National Security was visited by a delegation from the United States, and was received by commission Secretary Oleksandr Chupakhin and people's deputies Yaroslav Ilyasevych and Mykola Kashlyakov. The guest experts in the realm of disarmament and export controls were familiarized with the structure and authority of the commission. The desire was expressed to maintain permanent contacts with it. They also discussed the problem of restraining the still uncontrolled proliferation of strategically important materials and technologies around the world, which could be used for military and not only peaceful purposes. The importance for the fate of mankind of implementing a broad-scale program of disarmament on the basis of the Trilateral Agreement of Ukraine, Russia and the United States was emphasized.

Cabinet of Ministers Considers Fate of Kharkiv Armor Academy

94UM0551F Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
28 Jul 94 p 1

[Report from Inf. "NA": "What of the Kharkiv Guards?—The Answer Lies With the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine"]

[Text] Many officers and cadets have been turning to the editors with the same question of late: has the Kharkiv Guards Higher Tank Command School really been restored? This military educational institution, after all, formed in the first postwar years (there were, by the way,

two Guards tank schools in the former Union), provided the armed forces with quite a contingent of highly qualified commanders over the years of its existence. Recruitment to the KhHVTKU has halted several years ago in connection with the reform of military education in Ukraine. And now?

We addressed this question to the Main Directorate for Military Education of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine.

"Minister of Defense of Ukraine General of the Army of Ukraine Vitaliy Radetsky made the decision to restore the school as an affiliate of the Kiev Ground Forces Institute [KISV]," answered Deputy Chief of the HUVU and Directorate for Educational Methodology and Scientific Work Colonel Valentyn Leonov. "They are planning, that is, to train officers in the command fields at the school, who had to be trained before that at the KISV. The recruitment of cadets in Kiev and Kharkiv could thus become the first at the renewed school accordingly."

But it is still premature to rejoice at the second coming of the KhHVTKU. The fact is, as Valentyn Volodymyrovych explained, that the appropriate decree by the Cabinet of Ministers is required for the legal formation, so to speak, of the existence of the school. The draft of that document is already with the government. Shall we wait?

Designer Analyzes Ship Construction, Calls for Multipurpose Ships

94UM0546A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
3 Aug 94 p 2

[Article by Serhiy Kryvko, chief designer of the Ministry of Machine Building, the VPK and Conversion for military shipbuilding, city of Mykolayiv, under the rubric "Building the Armed Forces: Problems, Experience, Prospects": "The Fleet Needs Multipurpose Ships"]

[Text] *The political clashes surrounding the Black Sea Fleet [ChF] have essentially pushed into the background the no less urgent question of replenishing the ship inventory of the Ukrainian Navy with ships of a new generation. Pushed back, but not removed from the agenda, since regardless of whether the division of the ChF occurs or not, the problem of creating national designs of combat vessels remains a most acute one.*

The average age of the principal ships of the ChF is 16—18 years, after all; that is, even the youngest ships will be scrapped by 2003—2005, having served out their 25-year service lives.

The amount of funds being allocated for technical maintenance and repairs has moreover dropped sharply owing to the economic situation, which will naturally also have an effect on the technical condition of the ships and shorten their life cycle.

It should not be forgotten that the composition of the ChF, with rare exceptions, is not the classes of combat vessels that would meet the requirements of the end of the 20th century in general and the requirements of the Ukrainian Navy in particular. And the classes of ships that are being finished under the programs of the former Union at the shipyards of Ukraine (small ASW ships of the Lutsk and Sokil classes, patrol craft of the Hetman Sahaydachnyy class, and a Slava class missile cruiser) are not, to put it mildly, contemporary.

Military shipbuilding is well known to be the most conservative sector of the defense industry. From five to ten years pass from the time of issue of the TZ [technical specifications] to the turnover of the lead vessel. If the KBs [design bureaus] do not begin the design engineering and the yards do not begin the preparations for production today, the slips will be occupied for a long time to come with other products, and the "day after tomorrow" will simply never come for the navy.

Thus, the realities are such that beyond any dependence on the political solutions, the Black Sea Fleet is an organism that is dying a natural death, and moreover in all types of forces (fleet, aviation, BRAO), and thus the question of reuniting its ship inventory in a some quality not in the form of the Navy of Ukraine, the Navy of Russia or a combined Black Sea Fleet, must be resolved right now. In all cases, moreover, actively involving the ships of Ukraine.

Many of the Ukrainian and Russian mass media have been filled in recent months with debate about what ship inventory is needed on the Black Sea in general, and in the Ukrainian Navy in particular, particularly since the publication of the Edict of the President of Ukraine "Preparation of a National Program of Vessel and Ship Building..." as well as during the regular negotiations with regard to the ChF.

The authors of articles on the possible role of the Ukrainian Navy have rushed from one extreme to the other, depending on their positions, level of knowledge of naval affairs, and political affiliations. Some see the Ukrainian Navy (regardless of the economic state of the country) as a great and diverse force that includes all classes of vessels, aircraft carriers and missile cruisers, while others (without regard for the geopolitical role of Ukraine) relegate it to the role of some pitiful version of the U.S. Coast Guard. Both domestic and foreign experience of recent decades, especially in those countries that are similar to Ukraine in geopolitical situation, is tossed away therein.

Taking into account the fact that the creation of a national navy is an expensive and prolonged affair, and mistakes that are made (God forbid!) today will be revealed six or eight years later in many billions (in U.S. dollars) of wasted government expenditures, the question of defining the priority directions in military shipbuilding gains particular significance for Ukraine.

An analysis of the ship inventory, as well as the shipbuilding programs, that are being realized and planned by such historical naval powers as Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, Italy, Spain and Germany, as well as Greece, Turkey, Denmark, Sweden and Portugal, among others, testifies to the marked changes in priorities in the creation of naval weaponry.

The sharp reduction in orders to meet the needs of the European navies for missile craft [RKA] should be noted. And while in some countries their "age" has clearly reached a critical limit (one of the largest European RKAs, for example, the West German type 143 and 143 AA/B, was designed at the beginning of the 1970s), there is no hint of new construction of that class of ships. The navies of such countries as Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Italy, among others, have none at all. And that is natural—a fighter-bomber or patrol craft, fitted with the same type of antiship missiles as a missile craft, carries out the mission of search and destroy against surface targets with greater efficiency and less dependence on the weather conditions at sea. Concealment and surprise in missile craft operations can be ensured only in the island zones of the European seas, which is what the navies of Turkey (the Aegean Sea) and Denmark (the straits of Skagerrak and Kattegat) count on. In Europe only those two countries and Sweden, which recently completed a small series of RKAs, are building missile boats for their navies.

It is exceedingly problematical to provide for the concealment of RKAs on the Black Sea, with its well-developed system of coverage of the surface situation and small islands in the southwestern portion. Here the vulnerability of RKAs to the actions of aviation is too high. The ability of a missile craft to withstand damage is also extremely low. This has been confirmed by the local conflicts of recent years. The RKAs cannot be fitted with the appropriate means of PPO [air defense] and electronic warfare owing to their small displacements. Their hulls cannot be used to create ships for another purpose—the protection of economic zones—either. This cannot be done in any case due to the incompatibility of the approaches to hydrodynamics, power engineering, autonomy, levels of physical fields and armaments of the ships. There is already not very successful experience in the former Union with the hull of the 1241 Molniya RKA.

The unvarying first place in the shipbuilding programs, as well as at the core of squadrons, of all of the European navies is thus held by frigates, surface escort ships with a displacement of 500 to 2,500 tonnes that may be classified as destroyers, patrol craft or frigates, depending on the country's national traditions. Moreover, whereas in the 1970s the ships were designed with displacements of 2,500–3,400 tonnes, a substantial increase in displacements is required taking into account the experience of local wars and the desire to increase the survivability and explosion and fire resistance, provide suitable conditions

and reduce the dependence on the weather conditions of these "workhorses of the fleet." And this figure is considerable—approximately 1,000 tonnes with the same complement of weaponry.

Frigates, as a class of universal and multipurpose ships, have turned out to be the most viable. Today they have the capability of:

- prolonged combat alert duty in remote regions of an operational zone;
- relatively little dependence on the weather conditions when carrying out their assigned tasks;
- prompt reaction to all types of possible threats from enemy air, land, surface and submarine forces;
- the possibility of maintaining solid long-range radio communications, command and control, and the coordination of various fleet forces;
- provision of anti-missile and anti-aircraft defense for one's own forces;
- the presence on board of a multipurpose, shipborne helicopter.

Frigates, in the thinking of Western specialists, have to be equipped with antiship and air-defense missiles, medium-caliber gun mounts, ASW weaponry, means of self-defense against precision guided weaponry (PGMs), have highly advanced radio, sonar and communications gear, contemporary means of navigation, EW and combat command and control. The automation of all processes must provide for a reduction in the size of the crew. The seagoing properties must provide for the use of weaponry under the conditions of closed seas for no less than 340 days a year, and the living conditions must be designed for personnel who are serving under contract.

Such characteristics are adopted for both wartime and peacetime. This is particularly topical in the performance of international operations along the lines of the UN, or when ensuring freedom of navigation or the extraction of products from the sea.

By investing quite a bit of funding in frigates, they are entirely justified in the West in considering that vessel to be the most optimal from the standpoint of the "cost-benefit" correlation. A unit of funds invested in the building and maintenance of a frigate, that is to say, will bring the greatest increase in combat effectiveness of a ship as a weapons system.

Opponents could say that Ukraine has a ship in that class under construction—the Hetman Sahaydachnyy patrol craft. Let's just upgrade it, they say, and we will continue its construction in the future as well. Aside from the figures on displacement, which correspond to the frigate range, the rest is unfortunately purely visual. As NAR-ODNA ARMIYA has already noted at one time (No. 93 of 21 January 1993), this ship was created on the basis of the design of the well-known Burevestnik patrol craft,

developed in the middle of the 1960s. They were unfortunately not able to achieve any fundamental changes in the areas of ability to withstand damage, navigability, physical fields or the accommodation of weaponry on the Hetman Sahaydachnyy class SKR. The loading of the ship was increased by 500 tonnes compared to the initial design, which had a clear impact on its tactical performance characteristics and potential for modernization.

The continuation of construction on this ship, or a "modernized" version of it, would only lead to the extension of all of its problems into the 21st century, but would not remove from the navy and shipbuilding industry of Ukraine the task of creating a modern ship in the frigate classes.

It would be more logical to utilize the experience of the Western European countries, not fritter away funds for the design and construction of ships under several designs, and begin the creation of a single design of a multipurpose frigate class defensive craft. The ship is composed of two subsystems—the "conservative," good seagoing hull platforms, which conform to all requirements for survivability, explosion and fire resistance, and speed/power ratio, have a low level of physical fields and a high potential for modernization, as well as the variable portion, the "payload," which includes electronics and fire complexes (with a high degree of integration and automation) of both national and foreign manufacture. The use of this approach (which is employed, incidentally, in the Netherlands, Germany and other countries) makes it possible to make changes in the armaments for new models with minimal hull reworking during the period of construction or operation of the ship, thereby maintaining its technical level for the duration of its entire life cycle.

The presence of a single class of ship in the Ukrainian Navy (a frigate, for instance) would make simpler and cheaper the training of cadre officers and the basing and technical maintenance of the ships. The construction of frigates of this displacement is possible at one of the shipyards of Mykolayiv that specializes in this area.

BSF Maintenance Facilities Transfer to Ukrainian Service

94UM0546B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
6 Jul 94 p 1

[Article by Captain-Lieutenant Albiy Shudrya, senior officer of the press center of the Ukrainian Navy: "Off To Join the Ukrainian Navy"]

[Text] The collectives of two repair and construction divisions of the 363rd UNR of the Black Sea Fleet decided at an assembly on June 27 to petition the leaders of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to join the enterprises that are part of the Ukrainian Navy. Some 86 of the 97 members of the collective of the 1966th Repair and Construction Directorate [RBU], located in Mykolayiv, voted in favor of the resolution, as did 56 of the 61 in the 213th RBU (Odessa).

The intention of the collectives to transfer to the Ukrainian Navy is explained by the grave financial situation that has taken shape in connection with the fact that the Black Sea Fleet command has not paid the 363rd UNR for its indebtedness in the amount of 1,369,000,000 karbovantsi, as well as the real prospect of the loss of work after the planned shutdown of those enterprises of the Black Sea Fleet in the near future. The 363rd UNR of the Black Sea Fleet has been added to the Ukrainian Navy by directive of the chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Reply to Question on Terms of Service

94UM0551E Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
26 Jul 94 p 1

[Letter and reply from the editors under the rubric "Return to Previously Published Material": "How Much To Serve?—The Answer to That Question Should Be Given Not Only by a Newspaper, but Also by the Commanders and Officers for Indoctrination Work"]

[Text] Dear editors, the conscript soldiers are writing to you. We were called to serve in the fall of 1992, when the term of service was established as 1.5 years. But then that decision was abrogated. So we would like to know when our draft will be discharged, since there is a certain confusion here regarding this issue.

Respectfully yours, the servicemen of military unit 48261.

FROM THE EDITORS. In accordance with Order No. 42 of the Minister of Defense of Ukraine of 24 February 1994, the discharge into the reserves of soldiers and NCOs who were drafted in November and December of 1992 for a term of military service of 18 months will be carried out in the fall of 1994, after they have served two years. Each serviceman, depending on the place where he was drafted, can thus count on being discharged.

We could close the book on this matter were it not for one question. Our newspaper has repeatedly addressed this topic, elucidating in detail the reasons that the president and the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine made the decision to extend the term of conscript military service. The flood of letters from soldiers to the editors has not abated, however. Are the commanders and their deputies for indoctrination work really not able to clarify and provide substantive answers to all of the questions that arise?

For now, we remind them that the reasons that the term of service and the discharge deadline were extended were given in NARODNA ARMIYA in the issues for 14 December 1993, and 11 January and 16, 25 and 26 February of this year.

Call for Better Scientific-Practical Cooperation in Flight Training

94UM0545C Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
5 Aug 94 p 2

[Article by Lieutenant-Colonel Oleksandr Makarenko, senior instructor in the flight-methodology department

of the Flight Personnel Training Center, under the rubric "Building the Armed Forces: Problems, Experience, Perspectives": "The Reform of Flight Training Requires Rethinking"]

[Text] As a specialist, I would like to speak out on some issues in the building of the Air Forces of Ukraine, and in particular the reform of the system of training for military pilots. I believe that the greatest mistakes have been made there. The specific nature of aviation creates the corresponding specific features in structuring the system of flight training. Neglecting them or ignoring general didactic requirements in designing the training on which we are counting in reforming flight education could lead to more than the unwarranted expenditure of billions in material assets alone; it is unacceptable in and of itself for any state, insofar as the failure to meet the main requirements toward the training of the contemporary military pilot will lead to an increase in the number of accidents and crashes.

The scope of a newspaper article does not permit a detailed analysis of the existing system of flight training in the Air Forces of Ukraine. I will thus restrict myself just to a review of the principal organizational and technical measures that have been realized therein. How much do they correspond to the level of contemporary achievements of pedagogical sciences in the realm of designing professional education?

Pedagogy has theoretical elaborations in quite final form today, so they can be used to structure professional education. They demonstrate in particular that the quality of the professional training of specialists in any field depends on the extent of substantiation of the limits of study, its content, and the principles for the organization of the educational process. It has been proven, and this tenet has become generally accepted, that the professional training of specialists must be structured with elaborations of models of them. Work has moreover been done in Ukraine in the realm of the development of models of the pilot that have won recognition and high regard in the advanced aviation nations. Qualifications characteristics that can be called even an element of a general model only "with great effort," however, are for some reason at the heart of the professional training of the military pilot in the reform of flight training in the Air Forces of Ukraine. They are limited namely by that.

An analysis performed from this viewpoint leads to the conclusion that such a system will not be able to provide for the training of the pilot in accordance with contemporary requirements.

The next observation is directly connected with the models of the pilot. We are talking here about the conceptual postulates inherent in the development of the system of professional training for military pilots. Cadets are educated in the system for training an engineer under the organization of Air Forces flight training that has been adopted. This signifies that engineering thinking is formed, by and large, in the future pilots before the start

of flights, which, according to the data of aviation psychologists, is markedly different from the thinking that is necessary for accident-free operations. Science today has a quite a quantity of statistical material testifying that engineering thinking does not allow coping with a situation under complex and non-standard flight conditions. More than 40 percent of the accidents and crashes in aviation today already happen owing to deficiencies in training. One should be reminded once again in this regard that the foundation of the training of any future specialist is the formation of his professional thinking. That is fundamental!

These reflections testify that the fastest possible start to a rethinking of all of the questions that pertain to the reform of the professional education of military pilots in the Air Forces is essential today. Much difficult work lies ahead. Its start could be a practical-science conference at the level of the commander of the Air Forces of Ukraine. Such a conference, given today's level of mutual relations between practice and science in flight training, would be virtually the only path by which it would be possible to remove the barriers that are hindering science from getting into the organization of training for the military pilot. It would become possible to see the actual state of scientific and pedagogical support for pilot training therein. It is necessary, finally, to begin structuring flight training on scientific principles. It should be recognized that one cannot manage the corresponding scientific specialization without pedagogical scholars. Such scholars exist in Ukraine. There is also work to build a system of training for military pilots.

The cooperation of scholars and practitioners of flight training must be ensured. This would make it possible to avoid dangerous tilts in the training of pilots.

Maritime Hydrophysics Institute To Create Ground Emergency-Information System

94UM0546C Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
27 Jul 94 p 1

[Unattributed item: "The Corresponding State Order"]

[Text] The Maritime Hydrophysical Institute in Sevastopol has won a state order from the country's National Space Agency of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine to develop and create a ground emergency-information system that is used in space systems analogous to the Kospas-Sorsak type, among others.

The new project will make it possible to create multipurpose measurement and information technology for the performance of operations at any point not only on the Black Sea, but on the world's oceans as well. It may be utilized to accomplish ecological tasks, in fishing and in the extraction of mineral resources from the sea bottom.

The Sevastopol scientists are fulfilling the state order on schedule.

Sevastopol Naval Institute Efforts in Face of Adversity

Commander Interviewed on Support Problems

94UM0547A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
4 Aug 94 p 2

[Interview with Sevastopol Naval Institute [SVMI] Chief Viktor Vasylovych Makarov by NARODNA ARMIYA correspondent Lieutenant-Colonel Serhiy Chornous under the rubric "Building the Armed Forces: Problems, Experience, Prospects": "Twenty Years Without Repairs—The Urgent Problems of the Sevastopol Naval Institute"]

[Text] Viktor Vasylovych Makarov was born in the village of Inhulka in Mykolayiv Oblast into the family of rural teachers. He completed conscript service in the Border Troops in the Transcaucasus. After completion of the Caspian Naval School in 1971, he served in the Northern Fleet in positions from commander of an electronic navigation group to the senior assistant commander of a submarine. He commanded a strategic nuclear missile submarine for four years. He entered the Naval Academy in 1984. He is a candidate of military sciences, and worked for eight years as an instructor at the Naval Academy.

He has been working in the Educational Directorate of the MO [Ministry of Defense] of Ukraine starting in May 1992. He took a highly active role in the resubordination of the naval schools in Sevastopol. He headed the organizational group to form the Sevastopol VMI [Naval Institute]. Today he has become the chief of that leading institute.

He is married, with a son serving in the Ukrainian Navy.

[Chornous] Viktor Vasylovych, the Sevastopol Naval Institute was born under difficult political circumstances. The SVMI is a child with a large inheritance—the storied traditions of two naval schools. Its fate, however, is not an easy one... How will you be able to accomplish the task of training specialists for the Ukrainian Navy?

[Makarov] Our institute was created on the basis of the Black Sea Naval School imeni P. Nakhimov and the Sevastopol Naval Engineering School [SVIMU], where specialists were trained primarily for the nuclear fleet of the former USSR. Those schools really do have storied traditions, among the best in the Soviet Union. But time inexorably marches on. We have been operating since September of last year within the framework of the Sevastopol Naval Institute, living and working with new staffs, and studying the military affairs of the future leaders of the fleet. The future of the Ukrainian fleet, after all, is forged at the SVMI.

We have set up a systematic educational process over a short period of time, despite all of the difficulties and

problems. Officers were trained at the SVMIU to support the power installations on nuclear missile submarines. Ukraine clearly does not need such officers, and Russia has rejected our services. We have found quite a good solution, I feel. The leadership of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, at our initiative, has reached a series of agreements with the State Committee of Ukraine for the Utilization of Nuclear Power [Derzhkomatom]. We are thus training specialists for that field. Our graduates obtain the rank of reserve officers, and will be working at AESs [nuclear power plants].

This collaboration is advantageous for both the military and for Derzhkomatom. The ministry receives the funds that are so needed by the military today, and the nuclear power plants get highly qualified specialists.

I was recently at the Chornobyl AES, where our cadets are undergoing practical training. It was pleasant for me to hear the nice words directed toward our executors, whose training is more highly regarded than the students from Kiev or Odessa polytechnical institutes. The decision was made, after an appeal by Derzhkomatom to the Minister of Defense of Ukraine, to create a special department where specialists will be trained to work at the country's nuclear power plants. We have recruited 125 youth for this today.

[Chornous] You train specialists in 17 fields, and there are 33 specializations. Even universities could be a little envious of that. Some specialties, as we see, are completely unique.

[Makarov] Our educational institution is a specific structure, oriented toward the tasks that are being performed in the Ukrainian Navy. Artillery, missile, communications etc. specialists, after all, are needed aside from the exclusively shipboard specialties.

We will be training specialists in all fields in the ship department. Specialists for coastal missile and artillery troops will also be trained in the coastal department. We have a quite strong mechanical-engineering department, where turbine and diesel operators and electricians are trained. We will be training officers for the operational-tactical level this year in a new department. A naval academy, that is to say, will be created based on the institute. Today we are actively developing changes to the standard organizational structures and establishments. They will soon be approved by the Ministry of Defense and, I think, we could be converting to the new structure starting in September.

We have unfortunately not accepted a single youth this year to the department in which we train specialists for the chemical troops. They will be trained henceforth at the Kharkiv Military University. Both the physical plant and the high level of the professor and instructor personnel there allow us to accomplish that training.

[Chornous] Why was the decision made to eliminate the department?

[Makarov] I think that politics is more to blame here than any clear-cut design. The fact is that specialists for chemical protection were being trained in Kharkiv for all of the fleets of the former Union. The Ukrainian Navy naturally does not need that many. We thus went to the Ministry of Defense and proposed that we train chemical specialists for all of the Armed Forces. The more so as the physical plant exists. Only such subjects as, for example, the tactics of chemical troops needed to be added, a department created and a training ground formed. Which we indeed did. The decision that was made, however, as I have already mentioned, was not in favor of the institute, or, I feel, the Armed Forces as a whole. But that is the order, and our business it to carry it out.

[Chornous] What are the capabilities for the training of officers for the navies of the CIS countries, or even the distant abroad?

[Makarov] We have also displayed initiative there as well, and will be seeking ways of signing agreements with various countries to train specialists for their fleets. The more so, as I have already indicated, since we have a department in which we train specialists for the nuclear vessels. The same class of boats that was built for the USSR is in the navies of India and the PRC. We have unfortunately not, however, achieved any appreciable results yet. But we are continuing to work in this direction with the hope of success.

[Chornous] Viktor Vasylovych, the belief is current around the fleet that a woman on a ship is, to put it mildly, a bad omen. But young women are being trained at the SVMI. Do you not see a contradiction between fleet traditions and the realities of the times?

[Makarov] No, I see no problems in this. Last year we accepted seven young women. They will be serving on shore after completing the institute: they will be supporting the radio communications centers, working as programmers, computer specialists etc. I would like to point out that they are especially diligent and disciplined in their studies.

This year we have accepted ten women. They are still living in the city. They come to the institute for classes and self study. A number of problems arises, after all, with their accommodations etc.

The everyday problems are unfortunately very much a hindrance in work, and complicate both the life of the commanders of the institute, the instructors and each cadet. I want to think, first and foremost, about improving the organization of the educational process, the curriculum, and creating plans for training in new fields... All of the questions whose solution lies under our jurisdiction we will solve, however difficult they may be. But everyday problems are driving us into a corner.

The two Sevastopol schools were planned to have capital repairs done on the buildings starting in 1976. Time

passed. Communications gradually broke down. Almost 20 years have now passed since the time repair work needed to begin. We are, of course, painting the cracks as best we can, repairing the sewerage system using our own resources... This is just cosmetic work, however, and we are not getting to capital repairs, since we have no funds.

[Chornous] The everyday problems of the institute are moving into the ranks of paramount ones. A domestic revolution is perhaps required to resolve them?

[Makarov] Starting with the bathhouse...

[Chornous] ...?!

[Makarov] Yes, the most ordinary things. We are carrying one and a half thousand people who are training in buildings on the Bay of Holandiya by small craft to the grounds of the former Black Sea school where the bath and laundry combine operates. Such a bathhouse costs a solid amount of money. Fuel is expensive today, too. You cannot fit more than 100 people into the small craft. So you can imagine how many trips are required to bring all the cadets across. So a secondary issue that should be resolved automatically becomes pressing.

[Chornous] Why?

[Makarov] The fact is that the boiler facilities that provided heat and steam for the Sevastopol Naval Engineering Institute on the territory of the Bay of Holandiya were allocated to the Black Sea Fleet in the process of dividing up that fleet. We had problems all winter with heating the teaching facilities and barracks as a result. That portion of the school has essentially not been heated since December.

[Chornous] The Black Sea Fleet people closed the valves?

[Makarov] Yes. Even though we had problems with payments, and they had problems with bringing in fuel. It should be remembered, however, that the valves remain with the Black Sea Fleet...

I cannot forget for a minute the weight of the unresolved issues of preparing for winter in general. I even went to Chernobyl with the hope of acquiring a portable boiler. In vain. It has been running, and the power engineers themselves need it badly. We found another organization, Ukrteplokomplekt. It was ready to supply that same type of boiler to us. But they are asking 1 billion 187 million karbovantsi. We still do not have that kind of money, and we will not have it in the near future. The question remains an open one. But we must resolve it without fail. Minister of Defense of Ukraine General of the Army of Ukraine Vitaliy Radetsky has appointed a commission that will soon be coming here to Sevastopol, to find a way out of this difficult situation and provide the institute with heat. This is our misfortune. We are preparing food for the cadets in electric boilers that we were able to get hold of last December, when the command of the Black Sea Fleet turned off the heat. We have

also started up field kitchens. They are in operation today, and water is being heated in them to wash dishes. Because we do not have sufficient electric-boiler capacity.

[Chornous] So the resolution of many of the problems you have mentioned is simply proving to be dragged out owing to the lack of funds. But the institute is receiving quite a bit of money just for the training of specialists for Derzhkomatom.

[Makarov] The fact is that that we cannot use that money either for repairs or for the acquisition of boilers. We are spending that money, by and large, just for wages, municipal services and the organization of the educational process. I understand that we are saving significant amounts of money for the Ministry of Defense, but...

[Chornous] So just what is the way out of this situation?

[Makarov] I think, first of all, that we need to expand the list of budgetary line items. The Main Finance and Economics Directorate of the MO of Ukraine would thereby expand the capabilities of the institute to utilize the funds it earns.

It will be very hard for us to prepare the future navy of Ukraine without the resolution of all of these problems. I would like to see that everyone who is not indifferent to the kind of officers and specialists that will soon be coming on board understands this.

[Chornous] Thank you for the discussion, Viktor Vasylovych.

Meetings Assess Maritime Engineering Support

94UM0547B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
28 Jul 94 p 1

[Article by Captain 2nd Rank Oleksandr Shcherbakov: "Ready Sleds in Summer"]

[Text] A three-day meeting of the senior officers of division of the naval engineering service (MIS) of the Ukrainian Navy that was held in Sevastopol was devoted to a host of problems in the preparation of military compounds for winter.

By an irony of fate winter always comes unexpectedly, aggravating unresolved questions even more, as happened last year, for instance, at the Sevastopol Naval Institute [SVMI]. The heating season at the institute was disrupted owing to the lack of preparedness of the boiler MIS of the ChF [Black Sea Fleet] and the steam lines, heating lines and heating stations of the SVMI.

It would seem that such an "unthinkable situation" should not be repeated this year. The chief of capital

construction and quartering of troops for the MO [Ministry of Defense] of Ukraine, Lieutenant-General Dmytro Rudkovskiy, who spoke at the meeting, announced that the institute has been allocated the necessary financial resources to complete repair operations and pay for the work of the boiler MIS of the ChF. And while there is still plenty of time until the first cold weather in Sevastopol, a considerable amount of work needs to be undertaken right now.

This idea was stressed repeatedly in the presentation of Ukrainian Navy MIS Chief Lieutenant-Colonel Yevhen Krychevskiy, analyzing the state of affairs with the preparations for winter in the military compounds. On the plus side, he noted the assignment of MIS division chief Lieutenant-Colonel Yevhen Romanovskyy. Matters are pretty good in the MIS division of Lieutenant-Colonel Serhiy Martyyan.

To the problems already listed should be added the circumstance that the naval engineering service of the Navy is in a building process. The Sevastopol division of the MIS under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Akhmed Zhdanov, for example, is beginning its activity, so to speak, from square one. They have to search for cheap fuel for winter and, simultaneously, resolve the issue of staffing the units with cadre officers and get set up in their new working quarters.

The specialists of the MIS, in short, face highly difficult tasks, the ways of accomplishing which they emphasized clearly at the meetings. Winter will soon be their harsh examination. For now it is still thirty above in Sevastopol...

New General Staff Academy Accepts First Class

94UM0551B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
13 Aug 94 p 1

[Item from Press Service of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine: "Armed Forces Academy Accepts Attendees"]

[Text] A significant event took place at the newly created General Staff Academy of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. A credentials board, headed by academy chief Lieutenant-General Valentyn Boryskin, defined and approved at its session the circle of officers of the armed forces and the National Guard who will be accepted for higher military studies at this educational institution. Approximately two hundred people will be studying in the operational and operational-tactical departments of the academy. Classes will begin with the start of the new school year, that is, September 1.

This signifies that Ukraine now has the opportunity of training officers for the higher command echelons using its own resources.

Kiev Missile, Space Technology Conference*94UM0551D Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
18 Jun 94 p 1*

[Item from Inf. "NA": "To Preserve the Potential Achieved"]

[Text] A practical-science conference was held at the Kiev Air Forces Institute to discuss questions of the development of missile and space technology in Ukraine. Deputy Minister of Defense for Armaments and Chief of Armaments for the Armed Forces of Ukraine Colonel-General Ivan Oliynyk emphasized in his report the importance of preserving that great scientific and industrial potential, which would provide an opportunity to ensure the defensive capability of the state and increase its prestige as a space power.

The presentations by Missile and Space Armaments Directorate of the Armaments Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Chief Major-General V. Lytvynov, the general designers of the Yuzhnoye Design Bureau and the Khartron Scientific-Production Association, representatives of the ministries of foreign affairs, defense, machine-building, the military-industrial complex and conversion, scientific-research and scientific and technical institutions, and military educational institutions at the conference all raised topical issues pertaining to defining priorities in the development of missile and space technology.

The results of the conference were summarized by Colonel-General I. Oliynyk.

Military Educator Discusses Preparations for Accreditation*94UM0560A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
11 Aug 94 p 2*

[Article by Colonel Mykola Neshchadym, first deputy chief of the HUVU [Main Directorate for Military Education] of the MO [Ministry of Defense] of Ukraine and chief of the MO Accreditation Center, and Major-General (Reserve) Mykola Poluyko, lead specialist of the HUVU of the MO of Ukraine and chief secretary of the Accreditation Center of the MO of Ukraine, under the rubric "Military Education: On the Path of Reform": "A Crucial Test Lies Ahead—The Military Educational Institutions of the MO of Ukraine Have Launched Preparations for Their Accreditation"]

[Text] The accreditation of an educational institution is the official recognition of its right to carry out its activity at the level of state requirements and the standards of education. All educational institutions, regardless of their forms of ownership and subordination, are subject to accreditation in accordance with the prevailing legislation and official regulations of the government of Ukraine. The military educational institutions of the Ministry of Defense [MO] of Ukraine will undergo it as well.

The purpose of accreditation is to acknowledge the capabilities of a specific educational institution to train cadre personnel at certain educational and skill levels, and to grant them the corresponding status.

The accreditation of all educational institutions is performed by a state accreditation body—the Ministry of Education of Ukraine. The Collegium of the Ministry of Education of Ukraine, based on decisions by the Intersector Accreditation Commission, grants an institution that is deemed to be accredited the right to conduct educational activity and issue to its graduates certain documents regarding their education and qualifications.

The Ministry of Defense of Ukraine has been granted the right to organize and conduct accreditation expert analysis of military educational institutions. The Accreditation Center (ATs) of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine was created, and its statute approved, by Order No. 122 of the Minister of Defense of Ukraine of 4 May 1994. Prominent specialists of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, scholars from military educational institutions and representatives of the central apparatus of the MO of Ukraine constitute the center.

The ATs, aside from the performance of accreditation expert analysis, considers its primary task today as assisting military educational institutions in preparing for accreditation, and providing them with methodological support. The appropriate documents have been developed and furnished to the military educational institutions, and consultations are being conducted.

The leaders of the military educational institutions have, on the whole, approached this matter with a sufficient degree of responsibility. A verification of the progress of preparations by the military educational institutions toward licensing, however, has established that not all officials in the system of military education know the standard documents very well, and not all institutions have been involved in this fruitful work.

Some feel that it is possible to get by without accreditation, referring to the fact that the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine will be forced to consent to some other status for the military educational institutions with a view toward cadre requirements. This stance fosters the monopolism of the military educational institutions in the training of cadre personnel. Specialists for the Armed Forces of Ukraine in each field are trained at only one institution, which rules out the possibility of rivalry and competition and, thus, attempts at competition for better indicators in the quality of training for cadre personnel. It turns out that each military educational institution is the best, and there is no need for it to improve itself. Once it is the sole one, who would dare to prohibit it from training specialists if something was wrong there?

Not all think that way, of course, but the tendency exists and must be taken into account.

Accreditation itself has three stages—licensing, attestation and certification.

The military educational institutions should complete the first stage—licensing—this year. The purpose of this stage is for the military educational institutions to gain licenses for the right to conduct educational activity with a declared status, and their entry onto the State Register of Ukraine.

The institutions of the system of military education have traversed a difficult path of re-organization and reconfiguration, changes in organizational decisions and, in some cases, have not yet even completed the organizational bustle from the period of their emergence. Various points of view are encountered with regard to the placement of this or that specialty at certain military institutions. The system for the training of cadre personnel for the Armed Forces of Ukraine, however, has by and large been defined.

The military educational institutions—the Armed Forces Academy of Ukraine, the Military University, the Military Humanities Institute, the Military Institute for Command, Control and Communications, two Ground Forces Institutes, two Air Forces Institutes, a Naval Institute, military departments and sections at the higher educational institutions of Ukraine—are each being created, for the most part, on the basis of military educational institutions that have absorbed their scientific-pedagogical and material and technical potential. There is thus a basis for licensing virtually everywhere, and there are opportunities to complete not only licensing but also certification at the highest level—the fourth level of accreditation—at such institutions as the Kharkiv Military University and the Kiev Air Forces Institute.

An institution prepares the appropriate materials for licensing—the conceptual framework for the activity of the military educational institution, its charter and program of educational activity, the composition of the professorial and instructional staff and the logistical support. It is necessary, first and foremost, that the institution (its command, academic council, departments and sections) assess its own capabilities with regard to the expected training level of specialists, with a regard for the requirements of the standards of education and the criteria of accreditation.

There is not much desire of the command to train these or those specialists, and orders on that score are few. The appropriate conditions must be created. The scientific-pedagogical potential must be assessed first and foremost. There are quite a few instances where the commanders make the decision to assign officers from among the troops to the instructor staff who not only do not have academic degrees and titles, but also do not have any experience in instructional work. One could be reconciled to these decisions if young and promising officers are being assigned to these positions. But what scientific-pedagogical prospects can an officer have, who is already reaching the age of completing his military service?

One criterion essential for the accreditation of a specialty at the fourth level (granting the right to train masters),

pertaining to the training of the instructors in the departments that are putting out specialists in those fields, is the requirement that the department be headed by a doctor or candidate of sciences who trains graduate students or is a member of a specialized council, with the proportionate share of doctors of sciences and professors on the professorial and instructional staff of the department being no less than 10 percent, and with doctors and candidates of sciences, professors and docents not less than 75 percent. Those criteria are reduced by half for accreditation at the third level (granting the right to train specialists). But that is also quite a few!

An educational institution may be accredited at the fourth level, in case of the accreditation at that level of no less than 70 percent of the specialties in which specialists are trained in it.

Taking into account the complexity of the issue of training the professorial and instructional staff, the accreditation body also grants an institution the opportunity to create a program of training for the professorial and instructional staff so that by the time the accreditation is completed (no later than the first graduation from that specialty), the indicators conform to requirements. The license may be issued if the expert commission certifies the reality of the program submitted. The commanders of the branches of the Armed Forces, the troops of the military districts, the directorates of the central apparatus of the MO and the military educational institutions must thus address the training of the scientific-pedagogical personnel, and utilize the post-graduate students and doctoral candidates, reserves of the troops and scientific institutions, opportunities for integration with civilian higher educational institutions etc.

The problem of accreditation has unfortunately not yet reached the administrative bodies to which the military educational institutions are directly subordinate. Not all of them understand yet that without the licensing and subsequent accreditation of each specialty and the educational institution as a whole, it will not be able to gain the right to issue its graduates documents on their education and qualifications of the state type.

I would like to raise one other issue connected with the impending accreditation. The voices against the necessary transition to state requirements pertaining to the content of higher education, although there are not all that many of them, have nonetheless not abated. The necessity of giving officers higher education with a professional thrust (baccalaureate) is still being received equivocally. One can sometimes hear proposals that it is necessary to train to the qualification level of a specialist for four years, provide higher education (a civilian diploma for higher education), and then something more in that field. It would perhaps be more expedient to adopt the system of training of military specialists that is widespread in some countries around the world, and the United States in particular, where the training of officers is accomplished at special training

centers based on higher education, which they receive at civilian higher educational institutions. That is still inaccessible to us, however.

Second, we should not forget social protections for the graduates of the military educational institutions. The system of providing higher education, with a professional thrust and with a specialty that corresponds to a civilian one, provides an opportunity to give the graduate a truly state document, which would permit him to obtain work after his discharge from the Army.

In illuminating the problems of the coming accreditation, we are summoning all of those individuals affiliated with military education to joint work to raise the quality of training of cadre personnel in the Armed Forces of Ukraine to the benefit of the person in epaulets—the defender of the Fatherland.

Air Force, Air Defense To Hold Joint Training Exercises

*LD0509154094 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian
1250 GMT 5 Sep 94*

[Text] Kiev—Ukraine's Defense Ministry press service told UNIAN on 5 September that in accordance with the training plan of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Ukraine's Air Force and Air Defense will hold joint command training exercises from 6 to 9 September under the leadership of Ukraine's Deputy Defense Minister, Colonel-General Ivan Bizhan.

The training exercises will include mutual action between the Air Force and the Air Defense. The directorates of the Air Force and the rayon air defense will participate in the training exercise which will be held in areas of permanent deployment.

Pilot Training Course to Train Mobilization Specialists

*LD0509180094 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian
1500 GMT 5 Sep 94*

[Text] Nikolayev [no dateline as received]—Commenting to a UNIAN correspondent on the formation of the Central Officers Courses on the basis of the Center for the Training of Naval Pilots that will train experts for organizational-mobilization work, Major-General Valeriy Venher, the deputy Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces General Staff said today that the Ukrainian Army has a significant need for such experts: The formation of army structures is continuing and a reduction in the term for compulsory service soldiers and a transfer to contractual service is approaching. The majority of officers who are capable of carrying out such work have either remained in the Army of other states or have been transferred to the reserve. The only educational establishment that used to train such people is abroad in the town of Saratov.

One hundred officers from various Ukrainian garrisons have been enrolled.

ARMS TRADE

Nizhniy Novgorod Arms Fair Previewed

MM0609130994 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 6 Sep 94 First Edition p 1

[Article by Vladimir Kucherenko: "Behind the Facade. Nizhniy Novgorod Exhibition Against Background of Misfortunes of Military-Industrial Complex"]

[Text] The third military exhibition will open in Nizhniy Novgorod in a few days. The defense industry has again decided to show what it is capable of. But, once again, it is counting on state assistance.

According to a report by Gennadiy Yanpolskiy, deputy chairman of the State Committee for Defense Sectors of Industry, over 230 enterprises in the defense complex have expressed a desire to exhibit, and around half (45 percent) of them will be participating in the exhibition for the first time. Of the 1,800 exhibits, only 250 are models of weapons and combat hardware, while the rest are unique technologies.

The aviation industry will show not only means for the comparatively inexpensive modernization of the MiG-21, MiG-23, and MiG-25 fighters flying in the air forces of many countries but also civil aircraft. There will, for example, be the R-15 Delfin, Gzhel, and Dingo general-aviation aircraft and the Sever-4 and Volga-2 amphibious craft. They will also be showing units and systems for aviation technology and modern technologies for the smelting, casting, and heat treatment of alloys.

Producers of ammunition and specialized chemicals will present to the world the Kitlov-2 guided cannon shell, guided bombs, and means of modernizing old missiles.

For the first time our public will be shown the T-80U tank, the Kornet antitank system with laser sighting, new models of Kalashnikovs, and special weapons for the Ministry of Internal Affairs. An "offensive" by precision mechanics—third-generation night-vision devices—is expected.

ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA file: The system of the State Committee for Defense Sectors of Industry covers 2,100 enterprises and 660 research institutes and design bureaus (750,000 scientific personnel). Today 75 percent of their output is civilian.

Nikolay Zlenko, chief of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry International Military Cooperation Directorate, declared that until 1990 we competed successfully with the United States on the world arms market. But now (in 1992 and 1993) the Americans are in the lead (54-57 percent of sales). Russia slipped to fifth or sixth place in the world and only last year managed to attain third place, sharing it with France (Britain was in second place, Germany in fourth, and the PRC in fifth).

In 1993 Russia made just over \$2 billion out of arms exports. This year 40 percent more is expected. (For

comparison, approximately the figure was \$7 billion in 1991 and \$2.3 billion in 1992.)

Yanpolskiy, deputy chairman of the State Committee for Defense Sectors of Industry, and Sergey Belousov, a representative of "Rosvooruzheniye," say the same thing: Russia is fiercely opposed by U.S. and European arms dealers, who are uniting. With the support of their own governments, moreover. Here it is a matter not only of a reluctance to lose out on profits to us. The arms trade is also a geopolitical factor and an instrument of dominion over the world. For, by supplying weapons to a particular region of the earth, you influence the distribution of forces there, secure an opportunity to dictate your own terms to the purchaser, and ensnare him in contract and money nets. Understandably, the United States does not wish to forgo the positions it has seized.

Russia's advance into world arms markets has been made "sticky" by its internal instability. Will India, for example, buy inexpensive Russian arms if one fine day we might stop deliveries owing to domestic arguments? This is what happened in 1992, when we destroyed the old system of deliveries, which had just about worked, without creating anything to replace it. Deprived of spare parts, 30 percent of the Indian Air Force's aircraft ended up grounded. At the same time its likely enemy—Pakistan, which is "tied" to the United States—experienced nothing of the sort. It also happened in 1993, when Fedorov's Ministry of Finance failed to give the military-industrial complex sufficient money for the deliveries agreed with Delhi.

Therefore there is nothing surprising in the fact that the Indians turned down the Mikoyan Experimental Design Bureau and preferred British Aerospace, preferred the U.S. Galaxy transports to our AN's, and preferred the Israeli firm of ELTA to our modernizers of old MiG-21 fighters.

Not the least role in the unstable working of the Russian military-industrial complex is played by wholesale conversion. Enterprises are stuck without money. The civilian output which they assimilated in very difficult conditions in the space of two or three years cannot compete with the imported output which has captured our market. Defense orders in Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast, for example, have diminished by 97 percent, whereas in the United States, with a 5-percent reduction, the state compensates for companies' losses out of the budget!

DEFENSE INDUSTRY

Conversion, Arms Trade Problems Discussed

MM0109153194 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 31 Aug 94 First Edition p 3

[Interview with Professor Sergey Nepobedimyy by Sergey Ptichkin, date and place not given, under the

"Conversion" rubric: "Its Might Has Changed but No Collapse Envisaged"—first two paragraphs are introduction]

[Text] Sergey Pavlovich Nepobedimyy worked almost 45 years at the Machine Building Design Bureau in Kolomna, near Moscow, and rose from the rank of an ordinary engineer to general designer and director of the largest firm in the world producing different types of rocket systems. Since 1989 Sergey Pavlovich has been engaged on purely scientific work. He is an academician of the Russian Academy of Rocket Artillery Systems, a corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, and a professor at the N.E. Bauman Moscow State Technical University.

His name seemed to destine him for military work. The Shmel, Malyutka, and Shturm antitank guided missile systems, the Strela-2, Strela-2M, Strela-3, Igla, and Igla-1 portable anti-air missile complexes, the Tochka, Tochka-U, and Oka operational tactical missiles—this is a far from complete list of the things created at the Machine Building Design Bureau led by S.P. Nepobedimyy. In 1992 the Russian Biographical Institute nominated him "Man of the Year."

[Ptichkin] Sergey Pavlovich, people are continuing to say that the military-industrial complex is a kind of monster devouring its own country and that the sluggish and conservative directors of the defense sector are virtually the main opponents of wide-ranging reforms and market relations. In all public debates you defend the interests of the military-industrial complex. Is this not a manifestation of a purely corporate interest confirming the existence in the country of a powerful directors' lobby representing the defense sector?

[Nepobedimyy] In the first place I see nothing wrong in defending the interests of my corporation, in this case a defense one. Second, it is five years now since I ceased to be a director, I hold no administrative office, and I am defending my personal viewpoint.

Yes, in the USSR the defense sectors of industry enjoyed a privileged position although we were not rolling in money. Perhaps it was to the detriment of other sectors, but in the Soviet Union we managed to create an industry which was hardly inferior to, say, America's. The military-industrial complex assembled the elite of our specialists. It was in the military-industrial complex that the boldest ideas were implemented, and that was why exceptional, dynamic, and enterprising people entered the defense sector. What happened? It was a repetition of the situation in Russia soon after 1917. Instead of making rational use of the defense industry's wealth, its assets were simply squandered in a most direct sense.

The defense sectors of Soviet industry could have been a unique industrial breakthrough capable of giving impetus to the development of Russia's entire national economy...

[Ptichkin] However, the widely publicized conversion program has failed, giving the national economy little except enormous losses in the defense sector.

[Nepobedimyy] It would have been strange if the "Gorbachev-style" conversion had not failed. The general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee put forward a conventional party slogan and a conventional party propaganda campaign began, but meanwhile the country was entering an entirely new phase in its development.

They should have begun not by organizing the production of saucepans instead of tanks but with a thorough study of the market's needs and the elaboration of long-term programs which take into account first and foremost the interests of those regions where the defense plants and design bureaus are situated. Unfortunately, today the very concept of "conversion" is discredited and people no longer have faith in the potential of the military-industrial complex.

[Ptichkin] But has that potential been preserved? Are we not dealing with simply the illusion of the military-industrial complex' former might?

[Nepobedimyy] The country's military-industrial complex has not retained its former might, but there is no reason to talk of complete collapse either. The defense complex has the potential to exert a beneficial influence on the country's economy.

We have to start with cadre training, but on no account should we ignore the leading specialists who still exist in the defense industry. We should identify the most important areas of scientific and technical progress and give comprehensive support to those who are working on technological breakthroughs and are ensuring the growth of the state's potential. Meanwhile, it is time to pool the efforts of the Defense Ministry, the defense sectors of industry, agriculture, and everything connected with the environment because mankind's very future may be jeopardized by a slowdown in the solution of environmental problems.

[Ptichkin] Sergey Pavlovich, people may agree with you but where is the money to come from? Any program requires capital investments, and they aren't even paying us the money that we have earned.

[Nepobedimyy] Every ruble invested in the advanced sectors of the military-industrial complex will yield enormous profit. Every ruble invested in the Soviet defense industry produced an even greater quantity of dollars. The only problem was that people frittered away the world's hardest currency. The weapons trade is far more profitable than the trade in energy resources but at the same time it requires far greater circumspection and competence.

In the past the products designed at my Machine Building design Bureau brought the USSR billions of dollars in pure profit, but they were used like petrodollars—they were squandered. We in the defense industry

received a pittance from those sales. When the Gorbachev team ran the country the state completely lost its place in the world arms market. Russia now has to re-enter it. This is not yielding the desired results yet. Let us not despair, however. I think that "Rosvooruzheniye" should work more actively to recover its lost ground and seek new forms of cooperation with foreign partners.

We still have good assets in the form of a number of products manufactured by military-industrial complex enterprises which we could export. It is important to take two factors into account: When concluding deals we should not forget Russia's strategic interests and we should take the maximum account of the interests of the weapons designers and producers. There is a vital need for a sensible state protectionist policy, tax concessions, and incentives for those who produce goods which are in demand abroad.

Perhaps the time has now come to raise the question of the joint development and production of weapons with those countries with which we were previously in confrontation. For example, we could try to attract the Japanese electronics industry into our defense sector and organize the co-production of rocket systems with France, for example, or we could work with the Germans or the Swedes on a project for a tank for the future, and then there is a vast area of work where we could cooperate with the Americans. Perhaps such integration of the defense sectors would not only yield material benefit but also help to strengthen peace as a whole.

The standstill in everything to do with the weapons trade accompanied by the reduction in the state defense order is having highly adverse consequences. We are increasingly often being looked upon not as equal partners but as cadgers. The know-how which until recently was a state secret in our country is being shamelessly plundered.

I shall give you two examples. The T-80U tank made a great impression at the Abu Dhabi fair. It is a fine tank, but few people know that our design bureau produced a unique reactive armament system for this remarkable machine which makes the tank virtually invulnerable. Neither the United States, nor Germany, nor France was able to resolve the very complex technological problems in this area and create a reactive armament system for their own machines. Only Russia has this kind of armament complex, which places the T-80U above the competition in the world arms market.

Reactive armament was always regarded as one of the Machine Building Design Bureau's most closely guarded secrets, and even in Abu Dhabi we were not allowed to display it. However, there was no money for its production. It was a variation on the "dog in the manger" theme: We have nothing so you can't have anything

either. Then suddenly all the restrictions were instantly lifted. The design bureau is already under siege from eager envoys. Of course I support the arms trade. But in this situation you have to check and double check. After all, it could be that they will buy a few models from us ostensibly to study them for a major commercial deal in the future and then they will suddenly "lose" interest... In a couple of years' time the arms market will be flooded with identical products marked "Made in..."

These are not idle fears. Recently some enterprising dealers from an Asian country were testing the soil for the purchase of five (!) Igla portable anti-aircraft missile system servo mechanisms. These machines are one of the technical innovations which make the Igla superior to the Stinger. It was clear why they wanted to buy these individual components, but despite that we almost sold them....

I repeat, the weapons trade is a subtle business which demands a competent state approach, otherwise instead of profits we will get nothing but losses, although someone will possibly buy himself another Mercedes.

We should have tried to find out what kind of weapons Russia needs to ensure its defense sufficiency long ago. There must be an immediate and rigorous discussion, perhaps even under the president's supervision, between the interested representatives of the defense industry and the Russian Federation Defense Ministry during which it could be established what should be produced and what should not. There should be agreement on the principles underlying mutual relations between the Army and industry. After all, we call it the military-industrial complex yet in fact we have long regarded one another as enemies rather than comrades in arms in the common cause of protecting the fatherland. Unfortunately, we were too quick to dismiss the experience accumulated by the USSR Council of Ministers Military-Industrial Commission, which flexibly coordinated the interests of the various ministries and departments of the former Union. Today, when the military and the industrialists meet around the same table they try to grab things for themselves with the result that the common cause suffers and the single defense budget is ripped apart.

[Ptichkin] We are going through a fairly contradictory and difficult time. In your view, what are Russia's prospects?

[Nepobedimyy] It is not going to be easy in the immediate future. Nevertheless, I am an optimist by nature. I am sure that even when the situation is most dramatic we should not throw up our hands or bow our heads. Do unto others as you would have them do unto you, as the Bible says. If we care for Russia with a pure heart and not for the sake of gain it will repay us a hundredfold.

Defense Plant Switches To Producing Medical Instruments

MM0709101194 Moscow *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA* in Russian 6 Sep 94 p 2

[Report by Dmitriy Litovkin: "Scalpel Instead of a Ship? No Problem!"]

[Text] Severodvinsk—The "Severnoye Mashinostroitel'noye Predpriyatiye" Production Association is this year hastily assimilating orders from foreign firms for laparoscopic equipment to make it possible to carry out successful appendectomies, operations to remove gall bladders, and so forth.

This once purely defense enterprise is currently experiencing hard times, but it is not planning to "give up." The recently established medical equipment shop here has successfully organized production of these scarce instruments, which are the last word in technology in this area. There is steady demand for "Sevmash" products. Medics in Arkhangelsk, Tula, Moscow, and a number of other cities now prefer Russian instruments to their foreign equivalents.

Cooperation With Russia, Uzbekistan on An-70 Production

94UM0545B Kiev *NARODNA ARMIYA* in Ukrainian 3 Aug 94 p 1

[Report from "Inf. NA": "Production of the An-70: An International Consortium Has Been Created"]

[Text] NARODNA ARMIYA has already related the difficulties that have arisen at the ANTK [aviation scientific and technical complex] imeni O. Antonov in connection with the continuation of work on the new An-70 aircraft. Pleasant news has now come from the ANTK that will undoubtedly facilitate overcoming the obstacles to the series production of that transport aircraft. An international consortium has been created here for the series production of An-70 and An-70T aircraft. Its founders are leaders in the aviation industry—enterprises, firms and banks—from Ukraine, Russia and Uzbekistan. General Designer Petro Balabuyev of Antonov was elected chairman of the oversight council.

The consortium charter and the plan for cooperation, which codify the rights and obligations of the participants, have been signed. The consortium will have legal status after the approval of the documents by the governments of the three countries. The creation of this international association will make possible both financial and material support for the production of the new aircraft.

Officials on Different Aspects of Military Conversion Problems

944F1181A Moscow *NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA* in Russian 28 Jul 94 p 7

[Article by Sergey Babusenko and Andrey Vaganov under rubric "The Sum of Opinions: A Sore Point"]

"The Military-Industrial Complex Has Not Yet Collapsed, but an Ill-Considered Conversion Program May Hasten Its Demise"]

[Text] The once powerful military-industrial complex of the former USSR is not experiencing the best of times now: an avalanching decline in production of basic goods, inflation, loss of skilled cadres, insufficient financing, and a breakdown of former ties among previously integrally linked enterprises. Of course, with the end of the "cold war" and of confrontation there is no need for putting out enormous arsenals of combat equipment and weapons. The problem of converting military sectors of industry has become just as vital as the most rapid conduct of market reforms in the country. We would like to show how this problem is being solved through the prism of opinions of different people who are close to it to one degree or another.

The Bank

The Konversbank AO [Conversion Bank Joint Stock Company] was established 26 June 1989 in the form of a closed joint stock company. It has as stockholders major enterprises of atomic power engineering, of the atomic industry and of the construction industry, scientific centers, commercial banks and public organizations of Russia and countries of the CIS and near abroad. The bank has ten branches and is a member of a number of consortiums, interbank agreements and associations. Konversbank representations have been opened in the Czech and Slovak republics, and accounts have been opened in all basic currencies in 35 foreign banks. The introduction of SAMIC V2, a unique integrated management system which permits operating in real time, rightly can be considered the bank's pride. Built on the basis of the IBM AS/400 computer, the system has automated all basic bank functions to the maximum extent.

We chose Konversbank AO for two reasons. First of all, this is a real financial institution working in the sphere of conversion. Secondly, it is an ordinary bank whose clients are both legal as well as natural persons. We will recall that in 1991 the Silayev government developed a program for converting military production which, considering the USSR's technological and budget potential, could have been regarded as satisfactory on the whole. In the first stage the military-industrial complex was allocated around R100 billion, considerable money for those times, all in the form of preferential credits. In 2-3 years the planned funds could have ensured a transition to alternative products without great social stresses and losses in technological capacity of production, but the crediting schedule was disrupted for both political as well as economic reasons.

In the assessments of Konversbank specialists, a violation of the principle of continuity in financing conversion programs became one of the basic reasons for the serious situation in defense sectors. A chain of unpleasantness followed right after this: default of interest on credits, deterioration of enterprises' financial position,

breakdown of production and departure of skilled cadres. The seriousness of the situation was exacerbated by inflation, which nullified state efforts to rescue defense sectors.

Konversbank took the conversion program seriously. An Investment Administration for Conversion Credits with a staff of 12 persons—no small number even for a large bank—was established. An Expert Council was organized, operating basically on a voluntary basis and consisting of prominent scientists, economists and nuclear specialists whose competence includes the development and expert analysis of the advisability of financing particular projects. In their opinion, many conversion projects already could have been realized now had continuity managed to be achieved in their financing during 1992-1993. Of course, it would be difficult to index the value of output under inflation conditions, but these would have been problems of quite a different nature than those which military-industrial complex enterprises now encounter.

To its honor, under the present difficult conditions Konversbank continues to actively assist in realizing conversion programs still "alive." It stands to reason that inflation made its own corrections to some. Thus, the promising "silicon program" turned out to be more costly than presumed. There were marketing underestimations, which led to a situation where finished products ended up as surplus on the market because the productive niche was taken up by another enterprise. This concerned raw material sectors especially.

Konversbank experts assume that because of the absence of legislation permitting stimulation of foreign and private investments in conversion programs, a one-way path of financing was chosen: the state budget plus reliance on enterprises' own resources. But experience of recent years has shown that neither the state nor the enterprises especially have sufficient funds to successfully solve the problem of converting the military-industrial complex to alternative technologies. At the same time there is positive experience of cooperation with foreign firms. In Krasnoyarsk, for example, construction of plants of the well-known firm of BASF for production of audio and video tapes is progressing successfully.

The establishment of financial-industrial groups, about which much has been said recently, could become a real help for growth of production and also for success of conversion. In particular, the nuclear energy complex, in whose system many Konversbank stockholders also are included, largely is ready in its structure for integral formalization of a financial-industrial group. Everything again rests on legislation. The group will be able to rely on its own resources only when it feels itself to be a full-fledged proprietor.

Konversbank probably can be regarded as being among the cohort of those optimists who believe that all is not yet lost in successful realization of the program for converting the Russian military-industrial complex.

Bank specialists believe that for this it is necessary to pass legislation giving commercial banks which invest or credit funds in defense sectors the right to receive close to 50-60 percent preferential credits of the TsRB [Russian Central Bank] for specific, purposeful projects. With the existing rate of around 150 percent, it ends up where many enterprises cannot attract funds of commercial banks granting long-term credits.

It stands to reason that the principle of continuity of financing, about which much already has been said and whose violation essentially already has become the gravestone of the Silayev program, must be fulfilled.

Financing only highly effective conversion projects selected on a competitive basis could do a good service. Only in this case can one be confident that funds found with difficulty will not disappear into the sand and will provide a positive result. The selective direction both of financial as well as production resources for realizing the most effective and promising programs can create conditions for obtaining funds for fulfilling larger-scale projects subsequently.

The optimism and confidence of Konversbank specialists as to the need for state assistance to enterprises of defense sectors of industry are based on positive examples of the effective use of preferential credits. A number of enterprises successfully completed their conversion programs in the course of 1.5-2 years of crediting, and the cost in comparable prices of commercial products being manufactured exceeds the amount of credits used by approximately 5 times. The St. Petersburg Sila AOOT [Open Joint Stock Company] began putting out generators for autonomous power plants needed by the agro-industrial complex. The Moscow Molniya Machine Building Plant is putting out portable television sets and industrial and household separators. The Nizhniy Novgorod Experimental Design Bureau of Machine Building is putting out new-generation pumps and seals for milk processing enterprises, and so on.

In other words, the Konversbank people believe it is necessary not just to talk about the need to do something, it is necessary to begin and completely finish at least a few projects, and to believe this possible.

The Enterprise

Supporting and promoting development of the defense complex as a very important element in ensuring national security always was and is one of the most important state tasks.

Unfortunately, the work of defense complex enterprises presently is disorganized to a considerable extent, overall output volume has fallen and many new scientific and design developments have been halted.

Along with negative consequences of the general economic crisis, defense enterprises are subjected to avalanching conversion and ill-conceived privatization, which exacerbates the situation.

V. Glukhikh,
Chairman,
Russian Federation Goskomoboronprom
[State Committee for the Defense Industry]

Proportion of Persons Desiring and Not Desiring To Work Abroad by Age Group

Age Group, years	Up to 30	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and Older	Average
Aerospace Industry						
Expressed desire to work abroad, %	100	84.5	86.8	75.7	35.7	80.0
Did not express desire to work abroad, %	0	15.5	14.2	24.8	64.3	20.0
Atomic Industry						
Expressed desire to work abroad, %	100	83.3	73.2	46.3	23.1	47.0
Did not express desire to work abroad, %	0	16.7	26.8	53.7	76.9	53.0

The specific nature of Russia's intellectual potential is its exceptionally high orientation on military problems. The emigration of specialists of the military-industrial and military-scientific complexes creates the danger that their knowledge may be used by certain countries for militaristic purposes. In addition, in connection with conversion and the reduction of military orders, military-industrial complex specialists have found themselves in an extremely difficult economic and professional situation. It was no accident that the sociological study conducted by associates of the Institute of Employment Problems at elite enterprises of the aerospace and atomic sectors of Russian industry revealed a very high level of emigration intentions in their employees. The irretrievable loss of cadre potential of the military-industrial complex probably is the main danger of ill-considered conduct of the conversion process.

(Data taken from book "Utechka umov: potentsial, problemy, perspektivy" [The "Brain Drain": Potential, Problems, Prospects], Moscow, 1993).

The St. Petersburg Severnyy press Plant, once a powerful manufacturer of electronic products for systems controlling various objects, is not experiencing the best of times now. It continues to be just as clean and well kept up as it was five years ago, when it had something of which to be proud and when there were funds. From the plant's external appearance it is impossible to say that a hurricane of devastating force swept through this defense enterprise.

Severnyy press proper is not alone. Many military-industrial complex enterprises now lie in economic shambles. But this one is special. Its product is the brain of any combat vehicle, and just what kind of defense is there without reliable brains?

Under the Silayev government's conversion program the plant was allocated R90 million for 1992, no small amount of money for those times, but only R10 million were received, and only at the end of the year when they already were worth considerably less. In 1993 they sent an additional 100 million, but also toward the end. Remember what that amount was compared with 100 million in 1991 when the plan was made up.

Of course one can say that the processes which began in Russia at that time were so swift that neither the Ministry of Finance nor the printing press were keeping up with them. But one cannot believe that the consequences would have been as catastrophic had program financing been continuous right from the start on the part of the new Gaydar cabinet which came to replace Silayev's. In 1992 it still was possible to allocate R90 million in portions and successively, but not on a crash basis. Later the great inflation ate up both the painted power of the "wooden" ruble and Gaydar himself.

Now little more than 1,500 out of 5,000 persons, the staunchest and most dedicated, remain at the enterprise. Severnyy press Chief Engineer Nikolay Bessayev also

unquestionably is among them. "It is very difficult with cadres, especially skilled ones. Average wages at the enterprise now are R60,000 a month. The place of the person responsible for fire safety is now empty, but I cannot find anyone for it because it is worth' R40,000 a month. This is with that enormous responsibility placed on the person occupying it, but I cannot pay more. There is no more," says Nikolay Stepanovich.

The plant's problems, and for now it is serving the state, are "higher than the roof." If it is not paid (two submarines stand there with newly installed plant instruments, each worth 70 million, less the crews and fuel oil), there is nothing to pay the subcontractors from CIS countries. Sevastopol and Chernigov await payments for set-completing articles made long ago. Without them you will not fulfill the State Order, which now is around 50 percent of the previous level. But the Ministry of Defense has not paid a kopeck for what already has been done, and so the defense enterprise lives off of "consumer goods" (its state place is immediately pointed out from above in response to its display of initiative). Meanwhile there are Swiss and German firms which even now are ready to purchase the plant's unique equipment not being used because of the production decline and to supply half to Severnyy press after bringing it up to snuff at their own expense, thus improving the level of quality of the enterprise's products. But there are neither laws nor ways of solving this problem.

"Soon we will fall back to a four-day week," says Bessayev with a helpless gesture. This is not surprising. One of the largest consumers of Severnyy press products, at which there are no fewer than 15,000 workers, already shifted to three days a week long ago.

A possible solution could have been for the enterprise to become a joint stock company, but just who would undertake this with a defense plant, where the Ministry of Defense is the principal proprietor paying the money?

It also will be difficult to include Severnyy press in a financial-industrial group. Its products are so very specific. It also cannot be called "public," if only because a statute on this is absent for now.

The present government is taking certain steps to correct the situation. There are R600 million planned for Severnyy press for this year, but a half-year has gone by with no money. Is the fate of the 1991 program being repeated? An instruction of the GKOP [State Committee for the Defense Industry] was issued on setting up a fund of extrabudgetary money for internal injections, to which 0.3 percent of the profit (if there is profit) of sector enterprises will be allocated. Will this save the defense establishment? Most likely not. It possibly will provide a little oxygen to applied sciences working either at the interface or directly with the military-industrial complex, but no more than this.

There is a unique place at Severnyy press, an experimental facility in the product quality control system. Many millions of dollars were paid for equipment installed there. Now it stands idle, although the stands which create unique conditions, from sea fog to scorching desert, are certified for testing both for itself as well as for others, including also foreign partners. All that is necessary is a resolute decision, which, alas, the plant cannot make under existing rules. A resolute decision also is needed on the crux of the matter. "It must be decided whether or not we are necessary. Are we bankrupt or working capacities, and what is to be done with capital assets which stand empty? We are on service to the state and we ourselves can take responsibility only for those decisions which will be within the bounds of existing legislation," says Bessayev. "Now all of Russia's economy is Trishka's caftan" [from a Krylov fable, meaning that fixing one thing results in damaging another], he continues. "We understand this, but give us a little freedom to maneuver. And repay what we are owed."

The Joint Stock Company

At the end of 1991 sectoral Union ministries including the Ministry of the Defense Industry were abolished. The "Special Machine Building and Metallurgy" (SMM) concern was formed on the basis of 149 enterprises and organizations of the MOP [Ministry of the Defense Industry]. The concern was reorganized as a joint stock company in September 1992 in accordance with a Russian Federation presidential decree. The largest defense complex enterprises of Russia and the CIS were founders of SMM: Nizhniy Tagil Uralvagonzavod [Ural Railcar Building Plant]; PO Votkinskiy zavod [Votkinsk Plant Production Association]; Omsk "Transport Machine Building Plant"; and plants of Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Kirghizia. The main goal of SMM Joint Stock Company is to coordinate founders' actions in accomplishing tasks of fullest satisfaction of clients' needs for development, production and delivery of weapon and military equipment systems and building up the production of civilian products on the basis of conversion.

SMM Joint Stock Company does not set for itself the task of earning money at any cost, but is acting above all in the interests of the founders and the state. Along with regulation requirements, SMM also is carrying out a number of very important state programs comprising up to 80 percent of the overall volume of work. These programs are being financed from state budget funds. So as you see, the government trusts the joint stock company.

Without question, the personality of the head of SMM played more than a minor role in this. Stanislav Pavlovich Chernov was born in Leningrad in 1937. He completed the Military Mechanical Institute and went to work at the Kirovsk Plant. His first position was as shop industrial engineer, then he was shop chief, plant chief mechanic and general director. After this came an invitation to Moscow to the position of first deputy minister of the defense industry. After the August events of 1991 he became chairman of the commission for abolishing this same ministry. Now Stanislav Chernov is president of SMM Joint Stock Company.

SMM is charged with developing and producing an equipment system for deep-penetrating hydraulic fracturing of formations in oil and gas wells. There are no analogues either in Russia or the CIS. Over 35 enterprises and organizations are taking part in the work. Oilmen believe this will increase oil recovery of low-yielding wells by 2-3 times. In five years the increase in oil production will be up to 25 million tonnes.

Under an order of the Russian Federation Ministry of Finance and Russian Federation Central Bank, the joint stock company has been given assignments to develop and manufacture domestic special polygraphic equipment for making securities.

These and similar programs can be viewed as a model of conversion. In Chernov's opinion, conversion programs must be specifically of that nature. Forcing enterprises which have precision, high-technology equipment and a science-intensive system of supporting production to put out the first consumer goods they come across essentially means pounding nails with a computer.

It is reasonable to ask: But we know that both the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of the Defense Industry of the USSR always put out consumer goods, so what changed? The fact is that when we speak of producing consumer goods at defense enterprises, it must be borne in mind that most of the capacities created for producing military equipment and weapons cannot be used for manufacturing consumer goods. It is impossible to put out washing machines on equipment that produces tanks. More correctly, in principle it is possible to put out everything, but this will be inefficient production. A series-produced tank is one thing and a series-produced refrigerator another. But on this equipment, for example, it is possible to successfully manufacture fire extinguishing equipment or oil production equipment.

In addition, it is necessary to constantly preserve weapon making capacities—so-called mobilization capacities. They must not be touched under any kind of conversion.

And so 80 percent of SMM is the state order and the other 20 percent is contractual work. SMM has certain financial resources as a result of its basic activity, and it finances for itself a portion of the work not requiring enormous funds and which provides a return in the near term. SMM now has around 100 such programs for which the state cannot allocate financing.

This concerns both scientific research and experimental design work. For example, SMM Joint Stock Company now is financing work on new methods of acting on smelt to obtain given properties.

A project for producing fiberglass pipes for the oil industry is being prepared. They are 2-3 times stronger than metal pipes and their guaranteed service life is 35-50 years instead of the 5-8 years for metal pipes.

SMM also finances work on producing wheels with a reduced ground load. This development already has been patented and SMM figures on selling not technologies, but wheels abroad.

One of the most acute problems of the military-industrial complex is that of military science—how to save it and how to preserve this gold reserve of the sector. Of course, clearly no joint stock company today has enough resources to support all science for the defense complex. This requires incomparably more substantial funds than those which SMM has and, generally speaking, no firm except that of the state is capable of supporting military science to the full extent. And it is that way throughout the world.

SMM is doing everything that can be done for sectoral science, but this problem cannot be resolved fundamentally without state involvement.

Our state now is experiencing a rather difficult period. For a number of reasons, objective and subjective, the export of arms is declining and orders on the part of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense are very insignificant. And it is not because the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense does not need this equipment—the Ministry of Defense itself is in a very difficult situation due to insufficient financing.

But even that which already has been produced under order often is not being paid for. This concerns not only the Ministry of Defense, but also the Ministry of Railways, for example.

One often has occasion to hear a skeptical question: "But does the military-industrial complex now exist at all in Russia specifically as a complex? Has it not broken down into separate joint stock companies and private enterprises independent of the state?" The enterprises themselves which produce arms and military equipment of course exist, but they exist under conditions where

financial problems do not permit them to function normally. "So the military-industrial complex has not yet disintegrated, but, generally speaking, it is on the verge of disintegration. And it is holding its ground only thanks to the director corps," believes Chernov.

Lately many highly placed representatives of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense and of large defense enterprises have been actively propagandizing the idea of financial-industrial groups.

In SMM they do not propagandize the idea of financial-industrial groups; they create them. SMM Joint Stock Company already is participating in two such groups. They include both enterprises producing end products as well as major producers of set-completing articles, banks, and the "Russkoye oruzhiye" Corporation.

FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

Examination of U.S. Views on Future Armaments

94UM0573A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
26 Aug 94 p 3

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Mikhail Rebrov, under the rubric: "Military Technical Review": "In the Next Century They Will Kill 'Gently'—Some Foreign Views on 21st Century Armaments"]

[Text] KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has already discussed the development of views and theoretical developments in the United States with regard to the nature of future wars. Continuing this theme, we will familiarize our readers with the armaments with which the United States proposes conducting these wars.

The term "smart weapon" is being increasingly encountered on the pages of foreign publications. That is what they call the combat systems which have, as AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY magazine, a kind of mouthpiece of the American military industry, writes, "eyes, ears and a brain". "They see through clouds and fog, they hear sounds and receive electronic signals, they know what to hit and precisely when to do that". We're talking about technology-intensive systems, based on microprocessors and interconnected computers, that are capable of radically changing the traditional method of conducting war.

Indeed, if previously only a few of 100 gun-fired sabot rounds, high-explosive projectiles, or antitank missiles hit the target, now each projectile will be programmed in such a manner that the target will be destroyed. The principle is extremely simple. Thanks to sensors that are capable of detecting specific sound, thermal or electronic waves and to computers which instantaneously analyze the information received from these sensors, "smart" munitions distinguish a tank from a jeep, calculate the

trajectory of a missile and intercept it, or detect and destroy PVO [Air Defense] anti-aircraft weapons systems...

These "smart weapons", which are appearing as if from the world of fantasy, are not something exotic. Their development pursues a very definite goal. "We would be lunatics," John Alexander, a Special Forces veteran who fought in Vietnam, says frankly, "if we resorted to nuclear arms reductions without having a new concept of countermeasures."

We can interpret the idea of the "concept" in different ways. I interpret it as the achievements of science which gives rise to the idea itself. And therefore I will begin with the question: how does a small bird fly to us from remote Africa and find its hollow in a tree? According to the ideas of modern technology, it must have a brain that is capable of processing an enormous quantity of information which is "dictating" the flight route already at the moment of takeoff. But a small bird utilizes various power and multilayer systems. It "knows a little" celestial navigation and the Sun and the stars indicate the path to the bird. And when the bird lands in a given area, it "senses" its tree using an optical system. The technology of the future must operate in that same manner.

And, based upon the ideas of military personnel, it will operate in approximately that manner...

A network of seismic sensors, installed at a depth of four meters, warns, based upon oscillations of the soil, about the approach of enemy subunits that have already been noted by satellites. Sensitive instruments hidden in the soil precisely "know" where the tanks and the artillery are located. They "recognize" the former by their weight and the artillery pieces by the vibration that distinguishes them from jeeps and trucks. All of the information from the instruments is transmitted to the base in real-time. And the counterattack begins only after the enemy positions and enemy strength have been precisely determined.

Mines begin to coordinate with each other in order to "decide" when they need to be detonated. At that moment, the enemy attempts to create a corridor but will immediately encounter new difficulties: small bounding mines close the path of retreat behind the enemy.

Finally, the counterattack begins. A real hail of bounding mines is detonated at the location where the seismic sensors have detected the densest enemy concentration. The mines begin to move in a zigzag pattern, exploding only when they "recognize"—based upon the weight of the metal—that they have hit a tank or artillery piece. And at that time a multitude of small kamikaze aircraft, that are controlled by a fiber optic filament, come crashing down upon the target and, before they hit the

target, transmit a new portion of information on the battlefield situation to base.

The tanks that manage to survive in this hell will have to deal with a robot-soldier. This is a small device that, "sensing" the approach of a tank, becomes taller and opens its optical eyes while attempting to find the tank. If the target does not appear within a 100 meter radius, the automated soldier is guided to meet it head on and attacks it with a small missile with which it is armed.

That is how the battle of the future is seen. However, this will be very expensive—both in a direct and in an indirect sense. All the more so that existing computers are incapable of executing the functions of such a complex combat system: both as a whole and as individual assemblies.

The appearance of "smart weapons" also causes interference in the U.S. Congress. If the system is unreliable, it will be easy to lose it without destroying the target: how can one risk millions of dollars? However, Pentagon strategists' faith in a "silver bullet", that is, in technologies that are capable of guaranteeing them military superiority, finds active support among military industrial corporation pressure groups which see in this a new alluring market for "computer wars" or "information era" wars military equipment.

And yet where is the border between fantasy and reality? It is well known that one can destroy optical instruments with powerful lasers, that portable microwave weapons are capable of disrupting communications lines, and that satellites flying in low orbits can use pulses to neutralize missile launch pads... "All of this is a reality," says Retired General Richard Trefry [transliterated], President Bush's former military assistant. "But here we are already encroaching upon the sphere of secret materials!"

Of course, secrets exist. But the overall concept, while leaking through the regime's security barrier, is being made public. And then sensible people begin to understand that the striving for the "new intellectual battlefield" could open Pandora's Box with other types of exotic weapons: acoustic generators that disrupt the functioning of the brain, powerful microwaves to detonate munitions prior to their utilization, combustion accelerants, chemical substances that make metal brittle, microbes that transform fuel into gel, "sucking foam", etc.

Abroad they call these weapons "scientific-intensive", "milder" and even "gentle". Intellectuals predict that the new type of weapons will change ideas about modern wars. And it is difficult to object to that because all of the achievements of scientific-technical progress have sooner or later taken a military form. But if a "21st Century War" suddenly begins, we need to assume that the aggressor will encounter countermeasures of weapons that are just as "smart" and effective. That is a law of development of military science and equipment.

SECURITY SERVICES

Operations of Spetsnaz Unit in Transcaucasus

94UM0572F Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
23 Aug 94 p 2

[Article by Vitaliy Denisov: "The 'Bats' Can Do Everything but Fly"; "Service Address: Caucasus"]

[Text] A year ago my son Sergey signed a contract. Today he is in the Transcaucasus. He writes often, but he doesn't indulge in details, just says everything is normal. Even when he came home while on assignment he didn't say anything clearly. But how I would like to know what his work is like!

Nadezhda Georgeyevna Nikitina Vishnevogorsk, Chelyabinsk Oblast

It seemed that the extremists had provided for everything. They had taken hostages, women from one of the units of the Kutaisi garrison. This they reported to the command of the Group of Russian Troops in the Transcaucasus, saying no sudden moves and no one will get hurt. In complete certainty that no "sudden moves" were forthcoming, they began to wait for their demands to be met.

But what they got was the "Bats."

The boys in the dappled uniforms surrounded the garrison point quietly and covertly. In any case, the bearded raiders never guessed until the last moment that there were not only hostages nearby. According to eyewitness reports, the strike of the *spetsnaz* troops was lightning-quick and irresistible. The extremists were so stunned that there were no shots. And only when they were already standing with face to the wall, hands behind their neck and legs apart did the luckless thrill-seekers begin to understand that their attempt to arm themselves at the expense of the Russian Army had for some reason not succeeded.

The special-purpose [*spetsnaz*] battalion was formed relatively recently, three years ago. At the time, in the heat of recently acquired sovereignty, the local "gentlemen of fortune" haunted the military units in the Transcaucasus day and night. The situation became simply unbearable. This forced the command of the GRVZ [Group of Russian Troops in the Transcaucasus] to take steps to cool the militarist fervor of the raiders, who had made raids on military camps and equipment columns. A short time later, legends began to circulate about the *spetsnaz*, dubbed the "Bats" through someone's happy inspiration.

It is understandable that the *spetsnaz* not only do not need excessive advertisement, it can harm them. But the fact remains that the legends are not created in a vacuum. The lads from the special-purpose battalion know can do if not everything, then a great deal. And they have proven it more than once. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in particular has recounted their deeds repeatedly.

From the 'Annals' of the 'Bats'

Last autumn when western Georgia was enveloped in war, one of the militarized Georgian groupings (God knows whose exactly) "cast its eye" on the latest "Shturm" antitank systems, which were prepared for withdrawal to Russia. What was to be done? The *spetsnaz* were immediately sent to the Kutaisi region, where the systems were deployed, and as they say, took them under their "guard and protection." The vexed raiders, repeatedly attempting to seize the cherished "Shturms," finally decided on an open assault. But in vain. The antitank systems were withdrawn from the republic, which was engulfed in the flames of internecine strife, fully intact, and that, let us be frank, did not happen every day back then.

The list of combat operations successfully conducted by the special-purpose battalion covers more pages than one. One could go on forever about each of them. For behind each success of the "Bats" there is always painstaking preparation, a close checking of the circumstances and estimate of the situation, and finally (and most importantly) military proficiency and skill. And here to some degree is the result of the work of the *spetsnaz*: in 1993 the officers and men of the battalion were awarded 70 orders and medals.

One of these decorations belongs, incidentally, to Pvt Raul Shagiakhmetov. That same man whom Sergey Nikitin sometimes calls "teacher." A joke? As they say, "every joke has a grain of truth." For it was Raul, a classmate of Sergey and his comrade in childhood games, who convinced Nikitin a year ago to exchange the calm of civilian life for Transcaucasus service, fraught with alarms and dangers.

As for Sergey himself, he has not yet received any combat decorations, although he doesn't hide behind the backs of his comrades (that sort doesn't stay long in the battalion) and has already had time to be in several serious operations. "But why should they decorate me?" Sgt Nikitin smiled. "I just do my regular job. Like everyone."

Here the "collective character," figuratively speaking, of the *spetsnaz* battalion is clearly manifested. The "Bats" speak rarely of merits, especially their own. Egoism does not take root here. In their hard service the lads have learned a simple truth—the strength of all is the strength of each. In practice this means first of all the complete absence of hazing (but then, can it take root at all in units where the contract troops make up the majority?). In training all of them, the "old timers" and the "youngsters" work the same—they give it everything they've got. In operations—in operations it is true that "only old-timers go into battle." Well perhaps not only, but mostly, in any case. Indeed, not even the *spetsnaz* can do otherwise.

From the 'Annals' of the 'Bats'

There were seven of them, headed by battalion commander Maj Oleg Zubchuk. They were guarding a pass.

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All of a sudden some supporters of the ex-president of Georgia, Eviad Gamsakhurdia, were coming at them. In general the *spetsnaz* have a rule of not getting involved in civil war, not on anyone's side. But here there was no time for clarifications. Raiders, armed to the teeth and supported by APCs, were coming at them.

So the "Bats" accepted battle. More than 70 raiders and three pieces of combat equipment were left in that place. The *spetsnaz* themselves lost five comrades. The memory of Sr-Lt Ligor Popov, Sgts Sergey Rau and Andrey Bumenko, and Pvs Anton Borisov and Andrey Litvinov is held sacred in the subunit. It is in the recollections and the stories with which the new generations of "Bats" will be educated.

But then, let us not exaggerate. The life of the battalion by no means consists solely of combat operations. They are only one side of the coin. In principle the daily work of Sergey and his comrades differs not at all from the service of a young lad from an "ordinary" motorized rifle company. The same schedule. The same simple army existence. The same program of training, except slightly modernized with allowance for *spetsnaz* training. That is, they are taught not only to shoot, but to shoot expert, with all types of weapons that are in the battalion. Not simply to run, but to run fast, and with maximal loads. Also, the officers and men here must be highly skilled drivers, also combat engineers, also rock climbers, also . . .

Hand-to-hand combat classes occupy a special place in the combat training. In this sense, as in others, it is not a good idea to mix it up with the "Bats." Believe me, each of them can handle three, sometimes five adversaries.

As for their daily life, by today's standards it is clearly above average. The *spetsnaz* have several televisions, a video player, and audio equipment. Good food. Of course, for the "Bats," most of whom are two meters tall, and considering their work load, their rations are not always enough. But this problem is easy to solve, for the lads earn good money.

I was already saying goodbye to the lads of the *spetsnaz* battalion when I finally heard an answer to my question of why they came to the unit. Sgt Vladimir Golovin, Sergey's friend, answered for all:

"We are here so that our mothers can sleep peacefully there, 'over the mountains.' Does that make any sense?"

I don't know about others, but it makes sense to me.

The Chief of Staff of the Troop of Russian Troops in the Transcaucasus, Maj-Gen Yuriy Baluyevskiy, answers the questions of Sgt Nikitin's mother.

—How dangerous is it to serve in the Transcaucasus today?

—Stabilization of the situation in the region, which has been noted since the start of this year, allows me to give

a brief answer: Service in the GRVZ today is no more risky than in the Urals, for instance, or in the Far East.

—Can a contract soldier change his place of service?

—Everything depends on the terms of the contract. But even if a transfer is impossible now, after the service period is over nothing prevents the young man from making another choice.

—What benefits do the Transcaucasus troops enjoy?

—There are a lot of them. These include the counting of a year of service time as a year-and-a-half, the 150 percent wage rate, the additional two weeks of leave, and a number of other advantages.

12th Border Detachment Again Under Attack

94UM0572E Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 20 Aug 94 p 1

[Article by Anatoliy Stasovskiy: "The "Brest Fortress" of the Moscow Border Detachment"; "The 12th Border Element Tries To Prevent a Great War at the Cost of the Lives of Russian Boys"]

[Text] During his recent visit to Moscow, the Tajik leader Emomali Rakhmonov repeatedly stressed that he was confident there would be intensification of armed conflicts by opposition supporters in the near future. In a meeting with the CINC of the Border Troops of Russia, Col-Gen Andrey Nikolayev, Rakhmonov especially stressed that it would be possible to avoid large-scale clashes and bloodshed inside the country only if the Tajik-Afghan border remained intact, and raiders, weapons and ammunition were not allowed to cross it. It was stated that the Ministries of Defense and Security of Tajikistan were taking all measures toward that end. But between the lines it was not hard to guess that the Republic leadership, as before, was very much counting on the Russian border troops.

They themselves had already long realized that the Tajik opposition would not simply allow the elections for president of Tajikistan and the Constitutional referendum to be held. The start of implementation of plans for their disruption was evident even from the combat actions against the "internal" opposition recently occurring in the Tavildarin region. The border detachments soon felt its resolve too. Raider actions on the border grew broader and more active each day. Their reconnaissance activity was stepped up to find the safest and most convenient areas for infiltration of the territory of Tajikistan.

It would seem that there could be no place for complacency in such a situation. Alas, alas! Judging from a recent interview with ITAR-TASS by the First Deputy Minister of Security of Tajikistan Anatoliy Kuptsov, the special services did not expect large-scale raider actions on the border. He stated in particular that the armed opposition had no potential capabilities, and that the populace did not support them and did not want a new bloody conflict. Meanwhile, that was exactly when the clouds gathered on the border. According to incoming data, the raiders were building up forces.

Starting on August 17, reports from the 12th Border Element of the Moscow Border Detachment once again began to look like front-line dispatches. On August 19 at 0140, after intensive rocket bombardment of the outposts from the adjoining hills, detachments of raiders numbering more than 200 men with support of formations of the Afghan Mujaheddin headed by Kori Khamidullo (the chief organizer and executor of an attack on the 12th Border Element in July 1993), as well as Arab mercenaries who crossed from Afghanistan, attempted to capture and destroy the border outposts. According to reports of the press office of the RF Border Troops, soldiers of the 12th Border Element and reservists, with artillery fire support, inflicted losses on the adversary, and the raiders retreated. In the course of combat actions, 7 border guards were killed, and more than 10 persons were wounded. We report the names of the dead: Lt Vyacheslav Tokarev, Jr-Sgt Nikolay Smirnov, Pvs Sergey Penkov, Davron Ismonov, Bayramali Bekirov, Mezo Shokhnazarov, Abdurakhib Valiyev. Left as the senior officer of the element and miraculously surviving was Lt Oleg Kmelev, who called in artillery fire on himself at the most critical moment of the battle, when the Mujaheddin were getting quite close.

According to operational data arriving on 19 August from the Group of Russian Border Troops in Tajikistan, the situation has also been sharply exacerbated in other areas of the Tajik-Afghan border. It is developing with particular complexity in the sectors of the Khorog and Pyandj border detachments.

A large-scale offensive by the armed opposition is also indicated by the fact that according to information agencies, on August 18 more than 10 MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] troops of Tajikistan were killed and around 20 wounded in an unequal battle while on patrol.

At an emergency press conference in Dushanbe, the Chief of Staff of the Russian Border Troops in Tajikistan Col Vladimir Novikov noted that the border outposts of the 12th Border Element of the Moscow Border Detachment were under intense shelling both from the territory of Afghanistan and from the rear, which had been infiltrated by 300 raiders. According to Novikov, aviation, armored equipment, and rocket launchers were participating in the battles. Just in the night of August 19 the border troops had repelled more than 15 attacks and had not retreated a single step. With regard to the numerical strength of the adversary, Col Novikov reported that around 500 raiders were battling the border troops.

According to available data, the main strike of the opposition was planned for the Pamir region. The plans of the opposition leaders include a breakthrough of the border, consolidation in the Darvaza region, where there was to be a "special government" zone, and transfer to there of the "government in exile" headed by Said Abdullah Nuri.

Casualties at 12th Border Outpost Noted

94UM0572D Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 23 Aug 94 p 1

[Article by Anatoliy Stasovskiy and Vitaliy Strugovets: "The 12th Will Never Forget Them—All Russia Will Remember"]

[Text] Died on the night of 18-19 August, while protecting the state border in the sector of the 12th Border Element of the Moscow Border Detachment:

1. Lt. Vyacheslav Vladimirovich Tokarev, commander of the "Turg." temporary border outpost. He was born in September 1972, and was graduated from the Novosibirsk Higher Combined-Arms Command School.
2. Junior Sergeant of contract service Nikolay Valeryevich Smirnov, squad leader. From Chaboksar (Chuvashia)
3. Private Sergey Aleksandrovich Penkov, Russian. He was born on June 7, 1975 in Fergan. He was drafted from the Orenburg oblast.
4. Private Bayramali Feldiyevich Bekirov, Tatar, born December 14, 1975. He was conscripted by the Salsk Military Commissariat of the Rostov oblast, from the village of Kruchenoye.
5. Private Mezo Beinazarovich Shokhnazarov, Tajik. Born August 15, 1974, draft from the village of Shonek of the Khatlonsk oblast.
6. Private Abdurakhib Gagarzhanovich Valiyev, Tajik. Born in the village of Kostakos, Khadzhenk rayon, Leninabad oblast.
7. Private Davron Safarevich Ismonov, Tajik. Born November 20, 1973. He lived at the state farm of Durdyla in the Moscow rayon. He was drafted from Dushanbe.

Wounded, but did not leave the battlefield: Sr-Lt Sergey Medvedev, Privates Sergey Belov, Vaysiddin Buriyev, Shukrat Sharafutdinov.

For the courage and heroism they displayed, all participants of the night battle were recommended for orders and medals of the Russian federation, and Sr. Lt. Sergey Medvedev and Lieutenants Vyacheslav Tokarev (posthumously) and Oleg Khmelev were recommended for "Hero of the Russian Federation."

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has already reported the events of August 18 on the Tajik-Afghan border in the region of the 12th Border Element. Today we have learned the details of the combat actions in subsequent days.

Helicopters of the Dushanbe Separate Aviation Regiment of the Border Troops of the Russian Federation were scrambled at dawn on August 19. At intervals of 30 to 40 minutes twelve aircraft delivered several rocket and fire strikes on the attacking bandits, their weapons

positions, and crossings. The crews of the helicopters under the command of Majors Vasily Tarasov and Valeriy Usov distinguished themselves. Soon SU-25 aircraft from the Collective Peacekeeping Forces (KMS) joined the helicopters. Roughly at this time the reserve of the Moscow Border Detachment, around 100 volunteers from Kulyab and motorized rifle troops of the 149th Regiment of the 201st Division of the KMS came to the assistance of the border guards.

By the morning of August 20 more than 20 units of armored equipment and tens of artillery pieces and antiaircraft mounts from the 201st Division were concentrated in the Shuroabad axis. All subunits of the Group of Russian Border Guards in Tajikistan were placed in full combat readiness. According to the leadership of the Border Troops, these forces were sufficient to provide the necessary border security.

During August 21, with brief interruptions the position of the 12th Border Element continued to be subjected to bombardment both from the territory of Afghanistan and from bandits of the Tajik opposition who had infiltrated from across the border. A total of 50 rockets were fired on the border outposts and the border guard details. A retaliatory strike was delivered against enemy fire positions. During August 20 and 21 there were no losses among the Russian service members in this sector.

Col-Gen Nikolayev Visit to Tajikistan

94UM0572C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 26 Aug 94 p 1

[Article by Vitaliy Strugovets: "In Tajikistan Russia Is Paying With the Lives of Her Soldiers"]

[Text] "The price that Russia is paying here is very high. But Russia will pay this price for its security," stated the CINC of the RF Border Troops on August 24, upon his arrival in Dushanbe, at a meeting with journalists. The plans of Col-Gen Andrey Nikolayev and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Albert Chernyshov, also part of the Russian delegation, include meetings with the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tajikistan, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and leaders of the power structures of Tajikistan. The purpose of the working visit is to devise a solution for a political settlement of the inter-Tajik conflict. It will scarcely be possible to achieve this without a cessation of combat actions on the Tajik-Afghan border, however.

But apparently the opposition has no thought of halting the armed provocations. Its primary objective today is to capture some territory of Tajikistan on which a so-called "government in exile" directed by Said Abdullah Nuri could be established. In the opinion of the leaders of the "irreconcilables," this would not only significantly facilitate the leadership of all opposition forces, but also promote an intensification of their activities. The potential of the latter is not small. According to information of

the RF Border Troops, from 2 to 3 thousand bandits with the corresponding arms and equipment have concentrated just in the Garm group of regions (which recently we apparently have been ignoring owing to the very active events on the border). Add to this Gornyy Badakhshan, which to this point has not expressed its position regarding the upcoming elections.

Allowing for this, one can hardly expect improvement of the situation in the time remaining before September 25. Rather the contrary. And thus there will be more battles and more victims.

But let us return to the border.

On August 24, according to reports of the press office of the RF Border troops, an operation aimed at destruction of the armed formations of the irreconcilable opposition continued in the sector of the Moscow Border Detachment. In the course of the offensive actions conducted by five combat groups, with support from the aviation of the Border Troops and the Collective Peacekeeping Forces, the bandits were beaten back from commanding heights. They are retreating, avoiding direct confrontations. More than ten bodies of bandits were found at battle sites, and several launchers and more than 100 rockets, around 10 recoilless guns and a large quantity of ammunition for them were captured.

The operation continued on August 25.

Larger Border Operation in Tajikistan

94UM0572A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
25 Aug 94 p 1

[Article by Maj Vitaliy Strugovets: "Russian Border Guards Resist Wide-Scale Offensive of Tajik Raiders"]

[Text] The situation on the Tajik-Afghan border continues to be tense. Russian border guards have begun active operations to destroy the armed formations of the opposition operating in the border region.

Offensive operations were begun by four combat groups on August 23 at 0600 hours in the Shuroabad axis (the responsibility of the Moscow Border Detachment). The adversary avoided direct fighting and began to withdraw to prepared positions. At 0925, one of the combat groups reached a minefield that had been set up by the adversary. While cutting a passage and after already having removed three mines, the deputy commander of a combat engineer company, Sr Lt Yuriy Chernyavskiy, set off the fourth and died from his wounds.

At 1635 hours, the second combat group detected an enemy base and destroyed it in a resolute attack. Around 100 rockets, the launcher for them, and small arms were captured.

At 1645 hours the third combat group attacked and destroyed a raider detachment, in the process capturing small arms, a radio set and two prisoners, one of whom is thought to be an Arab.

At 1725 hours, two Russian service members were fatally wounded during a fire fight in the burst of a rocket fired from the territory of Afghanistan. The enemy launcher was destroyed by fire from a combat vehicle.

From 1100 to 1900, the actions of the subunits were supported by three helicopters and SU-25 aircraft of the Collective Peacekeeping Forces [KMS] in Tajikistan, which delivered rocket and bomb strikes on the raiders.

Early in the morning of August 24, fire strikes were delivered on probable enemy concentration and crossing areas.

As reported to us in the press office of the RF Border Troops, according to available data the raiders are concentrated against the right flank of the Pyandj Border Detachment in order to constrain the actions of the

border guards and KMS subunits fighting the armed groups illegally crossing onto the territory of Tajikistan.

Shooting in Tuaps Border Post

*94UM0572B Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 23 Aug 94 p 1*

[ITAR-TASS article: "Tragedy in Element of the Novorossiysk Border Detachment"]

[Text] Still under investigation are the circumstances surrounding an incident at one of the elements of the Novorossiysk Border Detachment in the Tuaps region, where a guard of the element, for reasons still unclear, shot three soldiers dead and wounded six others on Sunday. Steps were taken to disarm and arrest Pvt A. Khabalov. A criminal case has been initiated. The CINC of the Caucasian Special Border District is conducting the investigation.

A commission of the leadership of the Federal Border Service, headed by the Deputy CINC of the Border Troops, has been sent to clarify the causes of the incident and to take measures.

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